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PEEKING INTO THE HOUSE OF CARDS: MONEY
LAUNDERING, LUXURY REAL ESTATE, AND THE
NECESSITY OF DATA VERIFICATION FOR THE
CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY ACT’S
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REGISTRY
S. Alexandra Bieler*
“His was a scheme for the twenty-first century, a truly global endeavor
that produced nothing — a shift of cash from a poorly controlled state
fund in the developing world, diverting it into the opaque corners of
an underpoliced financial system that’s all but broken.”1

ABSTRACT
It is estimated that $800 billion to $2 trillion are laundered globally
every year, funding the schemes of bad actors and terrorists alike.
These astronomical sums are moved around the world without
detection; this is in large part due to the ease with which anonymous
shell companies, typically limited liability companies (LLCs), can be
created, particularly in the United States. America is one of the most
egregious enablers of this practice because most states require little to
no information about the person ultimately controlling the entity,
known as the “beneficial owner.” Working through an LLC, bad
actors often turn to America’s luxury real estate market that enables
the cleansing of millions of dollars of dirty money quickly and without
a trace. Considering this vulnerability, the U.S. Treasury
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
began to track the beneficial owners behind certain all-cash real estate
purchases made by entities and found that a third of buyers had also
been subjects of a previous suspicious activity report.
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In order to combat this issue, the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA),
a statute passed with bipartisan support, included provisions that
directed FinCEN to collect and maintain a database of beneficial
ownership information for a variety of entities, including LLCs. While
this is a huge step in the right direction and aligns the United States
with international anti-money laundering (AML) efforts, the
beneficial ownership registry is missing a crucial component: a data
accuracy verification mechanism. Without having a way to determine
whether the information being received is accurate, the beneficial
ownership registry stunts its own usefulness. This Note takes a close
look at how the problem of data accuracy is tackled by both nonprofit,
AML-focused organizations and countries with beneficial ownership
registries. It then reflects on the infrastructure and norms present in
the United States that could be helpful in attaining this certification
goal. Finally, it posits that, among all the options available, FinCEN
should utilize a proof of identity requirement, an internal, and ideally
external, cross-referencing structure, and a red-flagging system.
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INTRODUCTION
Do you know your neighbor? More pointedly, do you know whether
you have a neighbor? If you live in a crowded metropolitan area, you
might not. In cities like New York, Miami, and London, luxury buildings
with dozens of apartments remain eerily empty, taking their communities
with them.2 The significance of phantom pied-à-terre ownership has
implications well beyond the seemingly mundane issue of quiet buildings
or streets. These unoccupied properties sit at the intersection of anonymity
in corporate structures and international anti-money laundering (AML)
efforts.
Every year in the United States, more than two million corporations
and limited liability companies (LLCs) are formed in states that do not
require any information about who is ultimately at their helm.3 In AML
2. Emily Badger, When the (Empty) Apartment Next Door is Owned by an
Oligarch, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/upshot/
when-the-empty-apartment-next-door-is-owned-by-an-oligarch.html
[https://perma.cc/QUS7-B8S7].
3. Aroma Sharm & Yawen (Alice) Yu, The Corporate Transparency Act: New
Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 12, 2021), https://
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terms, these hidden characters are known as “beneficial owners,” the
natural persons who ultimately own or control an entity. The anonymity
the LLC allows for the commission of illegal activities, such as tax
evasion, bribery, money laundering, and terrorism financing.4 As
Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney observed, LLCs “are the vehicle of
choice for terrorist groups around the world that want to move their
money.”5 Instinctively, such unscrupulous practices may seem the
domain of a remote and unregulated tropical island; however, the
nonprofit Tax Justice Network ranked the United States as the second
worst offender in allowing individuals to hide their finances from the
law.6 In addition, a study by the University of Utah found that it was easier
to set up an untraceable company in the United States than in almost any
other country, with the “business-friendly” states such as Delaware and
Nevada being the most egregious offenders.7
One of the most popular ways to utilize the invisibility of the
anonymous shell company is through luxury real estate. The Washington
Post reported that, in the last quarter of 2015, 58 percent of all property
purchases over $3 million were made by LLCs.8 In the past 10 years, the
www.natlawreview.com/article/corporate-transparency-act-new-beneficial-ownershipreporting-requirements [https://perma.cc/FE4N-E73D].
4. SECRETARIAT GLOB. F. ON TRANSPARENCY & EXCH. INFO. FOR TAX PURPOSES
& INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, A BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION TOOLKIT 4
(2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/beneficial-ownership-toolkit.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7LW6-CV9X] [hereinafter BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP TOOLKIT]. For example, a
drug trafficker could set up a night club to appear to have legal sources of income from
the sale of tickets and alcohol, while in reality the money is from the sale of drugs.
5. Keith Larsen, Full Disclosure: New Law Requires Shell Companies Reveal True
Ownership, REAL DEAL (Jan. 27, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://therealdeal.com/national/
2021/01/07/full-disclosure-new-law-requires-shell-companies-reveal-true-ownership/
[https://perma.cc/XR4K-MNUD].
6. Financial Secrecy Index 2020 Reports Progress on Global Transparency – But
Backsliding from US, Cayman and UK Prompts Call for Sanctions, TAX JUST. NETWORK
(Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.taxjustice.net/press/financial-secrecy-index-2020-reportsprogress-on-global-transparency-but-backsliding-from-us-cayman-and-uk-promptscall-for-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/8A7T-9CMP] (finding the Cayman Islands to be the
top offender with Switzerland, Hong Kong, and Singapore ranking third to fifth).
7. Andrew Rice, Stash Pad, N.Y. MAG. (June 27, 2014), https://nymag.com/news/
features/foreigners-hiding-money-new-york-real-estate-2014-6/#print
[https://perma.cc/U6P2-HEYU]. The only locale that beat the United States in this regard
was Kenya. Id.
8. Ana Swanson, How Secretive Shell Companies Shape the U.S. Real Estate
Market, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016, 11:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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confluence of “decreasing real estate prices, a weaker dollar, and capital
flight from Russia and China” have made U.S. real estate incredibly
desirable for foreign investors.9 This has not gone unnoticed. The U.S.
Department of the Treasury (“USDT” or “Treasury Department”)
emphasized the risk of anonymous companies using real estate
transactions to purchase valuable assets in its 2020 National Strategy for
Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing.10 Former Director of the
Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN), Kenny Blanco, has repeatedly remarked that a key
vulnerability of the U.S. real estate industry is the ability to purchase
property through shell companies.11 The New York Times series Towers
of Secrecy: Piercing the Shell Companies brought the issue into the public
eye, painting a bleak landscape of brokers knowing little to nothing about
their buyers and persons under government investigation purchasing
lavish properties.12
There have long been calls for legislative action in regards to
identifying and tracking the beneficial owners shrouded by these
anonymous corporate structures.13 The Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), an intergovernmental body that sets AML standards, first put out
recommendations concerning beneficial ownership in the 1990s.14 Since
then, groups including the G7, United Nations, and European Union have

news/wonk/wp/2016/04/12/how-secretive-shell-companies-shape-the-u-s-real-estatemarket/ [https://perma.cc/G22F-V7F2].
9. Jeffrey R. Boles, Million Dollar Ghost Buildings: Dirty Money Flowing Through
Luxury Real Estate Markets, 45 REAL EST. L.J. 476, 486 (2017).
10. FINCEN, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST & OTHER ILLICIT
FINANCING 16 (2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/National-Strategy-toCounter-Illicit-Financev2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P99-HV6J] [hereinafter USDT
STRATEGY FOR COMBATING ILLICIT FINANCING].
11. INT’L COMPAR. LEGAL GUIDES, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 2020 4 (Joel M.
Cohen & Stephanie L. Brooker eds., 3d ed. 2020) [hereinafter ICLG ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING 2020].
12. Stephanie Thomas, Cracking Down on Money Laundering in U.S. Real Estate,
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y (Apr. 25, 2019), https://nyujlpp.org/quorum/thomascracking-down-on-money-laundering-in-u-s-real-estate/
[https://perma.cc/V4E7-3D
WY] (referencing Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Towers of Secrecy: Piercing the Shell
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (2015-2018), https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/shellcompany-towers-of-secrecy-real-estate [https://perma.cc/Y64V-4P4R]).
13. USDT STRATEGY FOR COMBATING ILLICIT FINANCING, supra note 10, at 40.
14. LEXISNEXIS, THE HIDDEN WORLD OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 5 (2017),
https://internationalsales.lexisnexis.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/377634/LxNx_Ben
eficialOwnership_0516.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ4V-3CVN].
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weighed in and implemented policies targeting beneficial ownership.15 In
the United States, legislation from the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to the
Patriot Act and related Customer Due Diligence (CDD) rules have
touched upon this goal. The most recent law to address this problem is the
Corporate Transparency Act (CTA).16 Among other enactments, the CTA
allows the Treasury Department to put in place a beneficial ownership
registry to assist the agency in identifying and pursuing bad actors.17 This
is an important step for AML efforts in the United States, but the CTA in
its current form leaves open significant questions about implementation
and effectiveness.
Part I of this Note discusses the legislative and regulatory strategies
implemented to combat the concealment of bad actors before the passage
of the CTA. Part II argues that without a verification mechanism within
the CTA to assure data accuracy, the effectiveness of the entire beneficial
owner database falters. Part II then proceeds to detail how nonprofit
organizations and other countries have balanced data accuracy with the
privacy of individuals and the burden on reporting parties. Part III takes
stock of these options, considers current AML requirements in the United
States, and argues that proof of identity protocols, internal and external
cross-referencing strategies, and a red-flagging system, if incorporated
into the CTA’s rulemaking, would be the most effective and practical
approach to ensure data verification and support the overall usefulness of
the database.
I. REAL ESTATE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST ANONYMITY IN THE UNITED
STATES
As the digital world expands and bad actors find new strategies to
conceal themselves and their ill-gotten assets, governments must keep
pace to uncover them. The many benefits of the real estate market, when
15. Who We Are, FATF, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/B6Y6L5EL] (last visited Nov. 20, 2021). In 2003, the FATF set the first international
guidelines to beneficial ownership and, in 2012, it released updated guidance that has
since been amended as of October 2020. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, BEST PRACTICES ON
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP FOR LEGAL PERSONS 5, 7 (2019), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/Best-Practices-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8J6E-8MAH] [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES].
16. See Larsen, supra note 5.
17. Id.
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combined with anonymous corporate structures, pose a difficult problem
for regulators. In understanding the solution, it is important to address the
advantages real estate provides, how the CTA’s legislative predecessors
were structured to handle bad actors in light of these advantages, and what
deficiencies those solutions suffered that the CTA now endeavors to
address.
A. MILLION DOLLAR GRIFTING
Owning a home is a quintessential part of the American dream that
provides the owner with many advantages; interestingly, these same
benefits make real estate an exceedingly attractive option for money
laundering. But there are some additional, unique elements that add value
to investing ill-earned gains into the U.S. real estate market. The merits
of this nefarious strategy are outlined below:
1. A Single Quick Transaction: There are very few ways to
successfully turn millions of dollars with suspicious origins into a
legitimate investment without significant difficulty, and real estate is
one of them.18 Once a piece of property is purchased, the derivation
of that cash is forgotten.19 Perhaps most importantly, there is nothing
inherently illegal about wiring money from an anonymous offshore
bank account to purchase property in the United States; further,
because it happens legitimately every day, the money laundering
process is coated with a veneer of propriety.20
2. Ease of Creating Opaque Corporate Structures: It takes only
a bit of inventive corporate structuring to make the ownership of a
property essentially untraceable.21 Buyers employ additional
strategies to increase obscurity, often layering companies atop one
another or filling out the LLC formation paperwork using the names
of lawyers or other placeholders called “nominees” instead of the
actual purchaser’s name.22

18. See Rice, supra note 7. See generally, ICLG ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 2020,
supra note 11.
19. See Rice, supra note 7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Louise Story, U.S. Will Track Secret Buyers of Luxury Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/us/us-will-track-secret-buyers-ofluxury-real-estate.html [https://perma.cc/H6M9-E3D8].
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3. Appreciation of Value: The real estate industry is further
vulnerable to abuse by illicit actors looking to launder criminal
proceeds because the value of high-end properties tends to appreciate
over time and can shield the owner from currency fluctuations and
market instability.23
4. Pressure Resistance: Small tax havens like Bermuda or the
Seychelles are largely defenseless if they ever face a United Nations
sanction or serious pressure from a major world power. 24 Popular
cities for luxury real estate in the United States do not face that same
potential of threats, making them ideal locations for property
purchased with dirty money, even when compared to other locales
with more favorable tax laws. 25
5. Practicality: Finally, an apartment in a popular city is not just a
financial tool, it is a place to live. Owning property in a desirable
location that can be used at the buyer’s discretion adds a practical
layer to the scheme.26

Real estate professionals are often concerned that the policies aimed
at stemming the flow of anonymous money into the real estate market will
have negative effects on said market.27 Yet, although it might be
beneficial to the industry, there are significant harmful consequences to
having so much anonymous purchasing in play.28 Take New York City as
a case study: foreign investment in New York City both drives up
purchase prices for every-day New Yorkers and increases rent prices due

23. ICLG ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 2020, supra note 11 (citing FINCEN,
ADVISORY TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND REAL ESTATE FIRMS AND PROFESSIONALS
(FIN-2017-A003) 4 (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/
2017-08-22/Risk%20in%20Real%20Estate%20Advisory_FINAL%20508%20Tuesday
%20%28002%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y72L-JW2M]).
24. Ryan Cooper, How Foreign Investors Launder Their Money in New York Real
Estate, WEEK (Nov. 13, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/736313/how-foreigninvestors-launder-money-new-york-real-estate [https://perma.cc/4PM5-8M7V].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Fang Block, Proposed State Legislation on LLCs Unlikely to Hurt Manhattan
Property Market, MANSION GLOB. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.mansionglobal.com/
articles/further-llc-disclosure-unlikely-to-hurt-manhattan-property-market-76263
[https://perma.cc/VWL2-JCZF].
28. See Jordan Metzger et al., LLC Sellers And Buyers Beware: Unprecedented
Reporting Requirements, JD SUPRA (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/llc-sellers-and-buyers-beware-68449/ [https://perma.cc/W7D2-N68J].
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to all the empty apartments kept off the market.29 Meanwhile, the
heightened demand for luxury real estate by money launderers shifts
property developers’ priority to high-end projects, further shrinking the
market for average city-dwellers.30 Additionally, whole neighborhoods
suffer, as these unoccupied apartments create “ghost communities” that
reduce local tax and business revenues, as well as the vibrancy of the
community.31
Both the incentives and the stakes are high. The amount of money
laundered globally in a single year is estimated to be 2 to 5 percent of the
global gross domestic product (GDP), which is equivalent to $800 billion
to $2 trillion.32 With such a significant sum at stake, many solutions have
been both contemplated and enacted. This Note, however, will limit its
discussion to a few crucial players: the BSA, FinCEN’s risk-based
geographic targeting orders (GTOs), the European Union’s Anti-Money
Laundering Directives (“AMLDs”), and, most recently, the CTA.
B. THE BANK SECRECY ACT
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was the first landmark legislation
implemented to keep bad actors from clouding the origins of criminal
proceeds through banks and other financial institutions.33 It initially
required the cooperation of financial institutions to fight money
laundering and has since been expanded to aid in tracking and intercepting
terrorist funding.34
The Patriot Act of 2001, passed in the wake of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, amended the BSA’s compliance program to adopt
customer identification regimes; this process is commonly referred to as
Know Your Customer (KYC), and includes a customer identification

29.
30.

See Cooper, supra note 24. See also Boles, supra note 9, at 492.
See Boles, supra note 9, at 492. Money launderers prefer more expensive
properties, because a higher price tag allows for more money to be cleansed at once. Id.
31. Id.
32. Off. Drugs & Crime, Money Laundering, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/money-laundering/overview.html [https://perma.cc/P9BU-KNWB] (last
visited Apr. 25, 2021).
33. Alina Laumann, The History of Anti-Money Laundering – Events, Regulations,
and Adaptations in the United States, KROLL (July 16, 2019), https://www.kroll.com/en/
insights/publications/compliance-risk/history-anti-money-laundering-united-states
[https://perma.cc/9MHT-933F].
34. Id.

202

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

program (CIP), CDD, and ongoing monitoring.35 CIP emerged through
FinCEN rulemaking in 2003 and requires, at a minimum, that financial
institutions put forward procedures to verify the identity of anyone
seeking to open an account, maintain records on the information used to
verify the person’s identity, and determine whether the person has any
links to known or suspected terrorist activity.36 The rule requires financial
institutions to retrieve the individual’s name, date of birth, address, and
unique identification number.37 Further, the CIP must include risk-based
procedures for verification to ensure that financial institutions have a
reasonable belief as to each customer’s identity.38 This does not, however,
require financial institutions to establish the accuracy of every element of
identifying information.39
In 2016, final rules were issued under the BSA to clarify and
strengthen CDD requirements for financial institutions.40 Relevantly, the
rules require verification of beneficial owner identity for all non-excluded
entities when they open a new account.41 This can be achieved either by
acquiring the information needed on a standard certification form or
through the substantive requirements laid out in the rules.42 Under these
strictures, the financial institution is permitted to, “rely on the beneficial
ownership information supplied by the customer, provided that it has no
knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into question the reliability

35. Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OCC, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervisionand-examination/bsa/index-bsa.html [https://perma.cc/K9DU-78PY]; FinCEN CDD
Rule: New Customer Due Diligence Requirements, TRULIOO (Jan. 9, 2018), https://
www.trulioo.com/blog/fincen-final-cdd-rule [https://perma.cc/J44T-ZVHB].
36. Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit
Unions and Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,090 (proposed May
9, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) [hereinafter Customer Identification
Programs for Banks].
37. Customer Identification Program Requirements for Banks, 31 C.F.R. §
1020.220(a)(2)(i).
38. FINCEN, GUIDANCE ON CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION REGULATIONS, FAQS:
FINAL CIP RULE 1 (2004), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/guidance/
finalciprule.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KPD-PVB6].
39. Id. at 6.
40. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg.
29,398 (proposed May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024,
1026).
41. 81 Fed. Reg. 29,398 (May 11, 2016).
42. Id.
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of the information.”43 The financial institution must then maintain a
database of the information, which is retrievable upon request by law
enforcement.44
The BSA and its progeny all rely heavily on financial institutions
to collect, verify to some extent, and store beneficial ownership data.
With the emergence of the CTA, some of this burden shifts from these
institutions to the entity requesting financing.45 The BSA also requires
the Treasury Department to revise its CDD rules to conform with the
CTA’s broad disclosure and verification requirements.46
Outside of the CDD rules, which address the behavior of financial
institutions, FinCEN has employed other methods to address the
concealment of beneficial ownership. One of the most successful is the
GTO program, which uses the increased risk of high-end real estate to
track potential money launderers.
C. FINCEN’S RISK-BASED GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING ORDERS
Although the Patriot Act authorizes the Treasury Department to
require that real estate companies scrutinize buyers, it has faced fierce
lobbying against issuing such rules.47 Despite this, since 2016, FinCEN
has issued GTOs, which require title insurance companies to report the
natural persons behind transactions that are not financed by loans from
institutions.48 Since then, FinCEN has extended the GTOs every six
months and expanded their purview.49
1. The Initial GTOs - January 2016
On January 13, 2016, FinCEN issued GTOs that “temporarily
require[d] certain U.S. title insurance companies to identify the natural

43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Cohen & Gresser LLP, Pulling Back the Curtain: Congress Establishes a
Beneficial Ownership Registry for U.S. and Foreign Businesses, JD SUPRA (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/pulling-back-the-curtain-congress-2944568/
[https://perma.cc/F9Y9-7GFL].
46. Id.
47. See Story, supra note 22.
48. FINCEN, FINCEN TAKES AIM AT REAL ESTATE SECRECY IN MANHATTAN AND
MIAMI 1 (2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/news_release/20160113.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6SJ-Q9HP] [hereinafter FINCEN TAKES AIM].
49. See discussion infra Section I.C.2.
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persons behind companies used to pay ‘all cash’ for high-end residential
real estate in the Borough of Manhattan in New York City, New York,
and Miami-Dade County, Florida.”50 FinCEN focused on all-cash
purchases due to the concern that those buying without any bank
financing were individuals potentially trying to hide their assets and
identities behind LLCs.51 FinCEN targeted title insurance companies
because they are a common feature in the vast majority of real estate
transactions.52 For the purpose of the GTOs, FinCEN defines a beneficial
owner as “each individual who, directly or indirectly, owns 25 [percent]
or more of the equity interests” of the entity that bought the property.53
Once title insurance companies identify those people, they are required to
copy driver’s licenses or passports, and hand their names over to the
Treasury Department, with penalties for any party who provides false
information.54
The initial GTOs were in effect for 180 days, from March 1, 2016 to
August 27, 2016,55 but they have steadily proliferated both in geographic
coverage and duration.
2. Subsequent Extensions of FinCEN’s GTOs
The success of the initial program56 spurred FinCEN to announce
additional GTOs in July 2016 that covered not only New York and Miami,
but also Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, and San Antonio.57 The
order extension was effective starting August 28, 2016, and ran for 180
days.58 Then, in February 2017, FinCEN announced the renewal of the

50.
51.

See FINCEN TAKES AIM, supra note 48.
Id. Prior AML rules already made it more difficult to launder in the mortgage
market, but cash purchases are much more complex. Id.
52. Id. at 2.
53. See Story, supra note 22.
54. Id.
55. See FINCEN TAKES AIM, supra note 48.
56. See infra Section I.B.3.
57. U.S. Title Insurers Required to Identify High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major
Metropolitan Areas, FINCEN (July 27, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/news/newsreleases/fincen-expands-reach-real-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-beyondmanhattan [https://perma.cc/76F4-VBZV] [hereinafter Cash Buyer Identification].
58. Id.
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existing GTOs to remain in place for another 180 days starting from
February 24, 2017.59
That August, FinCEN announced a revised version of the program
along with an advisory highlighting the risks of money laundering
associated with real estate transactions.60 In line with the then-recently
passed Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, this
GTO captured a broader range of transactions and expanded
geographically to cover Honolulu;61 it was in place from September 22,
2017 to March 20, 2018.62 Thereafter, the orders were renewed, increased,
and modified every 180 days.63
59.

FINCEN, FINCEN RENEWS REAL ESTATE “GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING ORDERS”
HIGH-END CASH BUYERS IN SIX MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 1 (2017),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2017-02/Renewed%20GTO%20NR%20
FINAL%20%28Posting%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WHP-EH4X] [hereinafter R ENEWED
GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING ORDERS].
60. FINCEN, FINCEN ALSO PUBLISHES ADVISORY HIGHLIGHTING MONEY
LAUNDERING RISKS AND ENCOURAGING REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS TO REPORT
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY (2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/201708-22/Risk%20in%20Real%20Estate%20Advisory_FINAL%20508%20Tuesday%20%
28002%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DGP-WZGR].
61. FINCEN TARGETS SHELL COMPANIES PURCHASING LUXURY PROPERTIES IN
SEVEN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS, FINCEN (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.
fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-targets-shell-companies-purchasing-luxuryproperties-seven-major [https://perma.cc/6UFQ-74CN].
62. FINCEN, GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING ORDER 3 (2017), https://www.fincen.gov/
sites/default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20GTO%20Order%20-%208.22.17
%20Final%20for%20execution%20-%20Generic.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EVJ-MQVS].
63. FinCEN Reissues Real Estate Geographic Targeting Orders and Expands
Coverage to 12 Metropolitan Areas, FINCEN (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.fincen.gov/
news/news-releases/fincen-reissues-real-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-andexpands-coverage-12
[https://perma.cc/UH2S-TT24];
FINCEN,
GEOGRAPHIC
TARGETING ORDER COVERING TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (2019), https://
www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20GTO%20Order%20FINA
L%20GENERIC%205.15.2019_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VZE-MLVC]; FinCEN
Reissues Real Estate Geographic Targeting Orders for 12 Metropolitan Areas, FINCEN
(May 8, 2020), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-reissues-real-estategeographic-targeting-orders-12-metropolitan-areas-1 [https://perma.cc/524X-HK6F];
FinCEN Reissues Real Estate Geographic Targeting Orders for 12 Metropolitan Areas,
FINCEN (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-reissuesreal-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-12-metropolitan-areas-2
[https://perma.cc/YS53-PYTZ]; FinCEN Reissues Real Estate Geographic Targeting
Orders for 12 Metropolitan Areas, FINCEN (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.fincen.
gov/news/news-releases/fincen-reissues-real-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-12metropolitan-areas-3 [https://perma.cc/W6C2-M3KZ]; Nicholas Nehamas & Kevin G.
TO IDENTIFY
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One commentator remarked that the success and continued growth
of the GTO initiative is indicative of FinCEN’s interest in a permanent
program, either through rulemaking or congressional legislation.64
However, while the GTOs generated important data in the fight against
money laundering, they have some important drawbacks that are
ultimately addressed by the CTA.65
3. Information Gathered from the GTO Program
In July 2016, FinCEN reported that the initial GTOs were aiding law
enforcement in the identification of illicit activity and providing
information helpful in guiding future regulatory approaches.66 FinCEN
also announced that the intelligence from the GTOs was providing
“greater insight on potential assets held by persons of investigative
interest ... generat[ing] leads[,] and identify[ing] previously unknown
subjects” in federal and state cases.67 FinCEN announced in February
2017 that since the initial GTO, it found that “about 30 percent of the
transactions covered by the GTOs involve[d] a beneficial owner . . . that
[was] also the subject of a previous suspicious activity report” (SAR). 68
Further, since the GTO program was introduced, one report found that the
number of all-cash purchases in Miami by entities had fallen 95 percent.69

Hall, The Hunt for Dirty Money in Miami Real Estate Is Working — and Will Continue,
Feds Say, MIA. HERALD (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
business/real-estate-news/article206232819.html [https://perma.cc/H5CA-FLWL]. It
should be noted that there were no announcements of the extensions in March and
September 2018 but also no indication that the GTOs had ceased. Id. The Miami Herald
article proffers that while there is no stated reason for this shift, it has been speculated
that it was due to the recently-appointed, Trump Administration head of FinCEN,
Kenneth Blanco, not wanting to draw attention to the GTO with President Trump’s ties
to the real estate industry. Id. However, JD Supra reports that “[s]ources familiar with
[FinCEN’s] thinking say the new order was kept confidential because regulators don’t
want to give money launderers a road map for structuring their transactions to avoid
reporting.” Stanley Foodman, Did You Know that GTO’s Have a $300,000 Threshold?,
JD SUPRA (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.jdsupra. com/legalnews/did-you-know-that-gtos-have-a-300-000-40284/ [https://perma.cc/8H9Z-ZKM5].
64. Thomas, supra note 12.
65. See infra Section I.C.4.
66. Cash Buyer Identification, supra note 57.
67. Id.
68. RENEWED GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING ORDERS, supra note 59.
69. Thomas, supra note 12.
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And, despite the increased regulation, according to the president of the
New York real estate firm Compass, there was no negative impact on the
overall luxury housing market.70
4. Drawbacks of the GTO Program and How They Are Addressed by
the CTA
Despite the success of the GTO initiative, there are still several blind
spots that the CTA attempts to address. A few of these drawbacks are
attributable to the use of title insurance companies. First, title insurance
companies do not always interact with the buyers either directly or
frequently enough where they would be able to know or easily learn who
the beneficial owners are.71 Second, title insurance companies do not
always handle the purchasing funds.72 Finally, the operations of title
insurance companies differ by state, so a broad set of rules is generally
too sweeping to target area-specific requirements, making the
promulgated rules less effective.73
Another significant roadblock is that many states do not require title
insurance, which allows bad actors to circumvent the GTOs entirely.74
While institutional lenders do require title insurance to obtain financing,
even where it is not statutorily required, money launderers are most likely
to employ all-cash and privately financed transactions.75 Unfortunately,
these are the very transactions that avoid the title insurance process and,
therefore, FinCEN monitoring.76 There is limited risk to the money
launderer in avoiding title insurance because generally he “can trust that
the title is clean” in luxury real estate.77 Both the developer and
“legitimate buyers have [most likely] conducted [an] in-depth title
search[] to secure their investment[].”78 In such circumstances, the illicit
buyer is safe from bad title and FinCEN. This type of loophole is closed
by the CTA, as coverage is not determined by whether the entity is buying

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Block, supra note 27.
Thomas, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a property or using title insurance.79 Under the CTA, unless a relevant
exemption can be claimed, the organization will be required to submit
beneficial ownership information.80
Another crucial point of criticism is the GTO initiative comes into
play far too late in the process and forces unreasonable search costs on
the parties involved.81 Currently, beneficial ownership is revealed not
when the entity is formed, but only when it purchases real estate.82 Under
the provisions of the CTA, beneficial ownership information must be
submitted at the time of formation, and companies already in existence
must report no more than two years after the implementing regulations
are issued.83 The CTA undoubtedly solves many of these important
problems; however, as will be discussed, it has its own gaps that need to
be filled. The next Part outlines the relevant portions of the CTA so that
its blind spots can be more fully examined.
D. THE CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY ACT
Enacted by Congress on January 1, 2021, overriding a presidential
veto and with strong bipartisan support, the Anti-Money Laundering Act
(AML Act), contained within the National Defense Authorization Act
Year 2021 (NDAA), amended the BSA.84 The AML Act is the most
significant change in U.S. AML efforts since the 2001 Patriot Act85 and
contains, in part, the CTA.86
Among other requirements, the CTA tasks FinCEN with developing
and maintaining a beneficial ownership registry for certain enumerated
entities.87 Under the CTA, the term “beneficial owner” is defined to mean
someone who owns 25 percent or more of the entity or who exercises

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See infra Section I.D.1. See also 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11).
See infra Section I.D.1. See also 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11).
Thomas, supra note 12.
Id.
See infra Section I.D.1. See also 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(B)-(C).
SATISH M. KINI ET AL., CONGRESS PASSES SWEEPING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
AND CORPORATE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP LAW 1 (2021), https://www.debevoise.com/
insights/publications/2021/01/congress-passes-sweeping-anti-money-laundering-and
[https://perma.cc/7UM6-KMYE].
85. Id.
86. Sharm & Yu, supra note 3.
87. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(A)-(C), (F).
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“substantial control” over the entity.88 The term “substantial control” is
left undefined.89 The CTA also carves out certain groups who are not
considered beneficial owners, including minors, persons acting as
nominees or custodians, employees, persons whose interest is only as a
right of inheritance, and most creditors.90
New entities organized in the United States must report beneficial
ownership information at formation;91 companies already in existence
must report the same information no more than two years after the
Treasury Department issues the implementing regulations.92 If there is
any change in beneficial ownership, the company is required to update
FinCEN within a year of the date of the change.93
Not every entity needs to submit information. In fact, many types of
companies are exempt, such as publicly-traded companies, tax-exempt
entities, financial institutions, and others.94 It also excludes any entity that
employs more than twenty full-time employees in the United States, files
federal income tax returns showing more than $5 million in gross receipts
or aggregate sales in the previous year, and has a physical presence in the
United States.95 The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security can also grant dispensation to any company if they determine
that reporting by that entity would not serve the public interest and would
not be highly useful to AML and anti-terrorism efforts.96 These
exemptions do not apply to most small businesses or single-member
LLCs.97

88.
89.

31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
See Corporate Transparency Act: New Federal Reporting Requirements for
Certain U.S. Formed or Registered Entities, SIDLEY AUSTIN (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2021/02/corporate-transparency-act
[https://perma.cc/5P3C-75TQ] (“The term ‘substantial control’ is not defined in the CTA
and remains subject to definition or guidance in Treasury regulations.”); 31 U.S.C. §
5336(a)(3)(A).
90. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(3)(B)(i)-(iv).
91. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(C).
92. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(B).
93. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(D).
94. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B). The CTA also allows the Treasury Department to
create further exemptions with the approval of the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security. Id.
95. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxi).
96. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiv).
97. See Federal Corporate Transparency Act Requires Companies to Disclose
Beneficial Owner, PORTER WRIGHT (Mar. 2, 2021),
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Reporting companies are required to submit, for each beneficial
owner or applicant: (1) the full legal name, (2) date of birth, (3) current
residential or business street address, and (4) a unique identifying
number.98 The unique identifying number must be a passport number, a
driver’s license number, or a FinCEN identifying number, available from
the agency upon request.99
Any person that fails to report complete or updated information, or
that provides false information, will be liable for a penalty up to $500 a
day and could face criminal fines up to $10,000 or a maximum of two
years in prison, or both.100 There is, however, a safe harbor if a person,
acting in good faith, corrects inaccurate information within 90 days of the
submission.101
Although the database is required to be nonpublic,102 under proper
protocols it can be accessed by federal agencies; state, local, and tribal
agencies; and financial institutions with the consent of the reporting
company.103 Foreign law enforcement agents may also obtain the stored
information by requesting it from the appropriate federal agency.104 There
are substantial penalties in place for unauthorized disclosure or use of the
beneficial ownership information, with a $500 fine for each day the
violation continues with charges of up to $250,000, and jail time up to
five years.105 The severity increases if unauthorized disclosure is made
while violating another law or as a part of illegal activity.106

https://www.porterwright.com/media/federal-corporate-transparency-act-requirescompanies-to-disclose-beneficial-owner/ [https://perma.cc/ME5H-8G6L].
98. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv)(I).
99. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(1)(A)-(D), (b)(3)(A).
100. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(h)(3)(A).
101. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(h)(3)(C).
102. Corporate Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(7)(A), 134 Stat. 4604
(2021).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2)(B).
104. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2)(B)(ii).
105. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(h)(3)(B)(i)-(ii)(I).
106. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(h)(3)(B)(i), (ii)(II).
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E. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVES
The E.U. AMLDs, which have been setting AML standards for its
members since 1991,107 are a good juxtaposition for the CTA, as they have
a long tenure and have broached many of the topics at issue. Fast-forward
a couple of decades to AMLD IV, which was agreed to in 2015 and
required implementation by June 2017.108 Under AMLD IV, the E.U.
established ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) registries and certain
regulations to help enforce them.109 AMLD IV defines the beneficial
owner as any natural person or persons who ultimately own or control the
legal entity, with a shareholding to ownership interest over 25 percent as
an indication of direct ownership.110 AMLD IV introduced an explicit
requirement for all legal persons, including companies, to hold and
maintain beneficial ownership information that must be made readily
available to competent authorities and obliged entities.111 Each member
state is also required to create a central register where beneficial
ownership information can be stored to ensure that the information is kept
current and adequate.112 AMLD IV required that competent authorities
and financial intelligence units could access the central registry to retrieve
information.113 It also dictated that Member States should ensure that
anyone who is “able to demonstrate a legitimate interest with respect to
money laundering, terrorist financing, and the associated predicate
offences, such as corruption, tax crimes and fraud, [is] granted access to
beneficial ownership information, in accordance with data protection
rules.”114

107. A Brief History of the AMLDS: Part One, COMPLY ADVANTAGE (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://complyadvantage.com/blog/brief-history-amlds-part-one/
[https://perma.cc/NW6P-Q6HP].
108. See Directive 2015/849, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
May 2015 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of
Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of
the European Parliament and of the Council, and Repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 2015
O.J. (L 141) 73 (EU) [hereinafter AMLD IV]. See also id. at ch. I, §2, art. 6 ¶ 1.
109. Id. at ch. III, art. 30, ¶¶ 3-10.
110. Id. at ch. I, §1, art. 3, ¶ 6(a)(i).
111. Id. at ch. III, art. 30, ¶¶ 1-2.
112. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.
113. Id. at ¶ 5.
114. Id. at Introduction, ¶ 14; AMLD IV also notes that Member States can allow for
wider access if they so choose. Id. at Introduction, ¶ 15.
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Just over a year later, the European Union adopted AMLD V, which
amended and updated the provisions of AMLD IV, and required
transposition by January 10, 2020.115 In a departure from the more
permissive requirements of the AMLD IV, AMLD V requires the
beneficial ownership registry to be public and interconnected across
member states.116 ALMD VI, the most recent update which came into
force in December 2020,117 does not make any significant changes to the
UBO registry or related areas.
II. THE CTA’S MISSING VERIFICATION MECHANISM AND A GLOBAL
LOOK AT BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA ACCURACY STRATEGIES
The implementation of the CTA aligns the United States more
closely to the standard for anonymity and AML compliance adopted by
the European Union, United Kingdom, and AML-focused nonprofit
organizations. However, the existence of the registry alone does not
ensure that reliable and up-to-date beneficial ownership information will
be received.118 Verifying information accuracy is a critical factor in

115. See Directive 2018/843, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
May 2018 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of
Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, Amending Directives 2009/138/EC and
2013/36/EU, 2018 O.J. (L 156) 73 (EU) [hereinafter AMLD V]; id. at Introduction, ¶ 53.
The quick turnaround between the amendments in AMLD IV and those in AMLD V was
caused by the proliferation of high-profile terrorist attacks in Europe from 2015 to 2017.
A Guide to the EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5), S YGNA,
https://www.sygna.io/blog/what-is-amld5-anti-money-laundering-directive-five-aguide/ [https://perma.cc/3R8P-DEZ8] (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
116. See AMLD V, supra note 115, at Introduction, ¶ 33, art. 1 ¶ 15(c), art. 1, ¶ 15(g).
117. Directive 2018/1673, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
October 2018 on Combating Money Laundering by Criminal Law, 2018 O.J. (L 284) 22,
art. 13, ¶ 1 (EU) [hereinafter AMLD VI].
118. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP TOOLKIT, supra note 4, at 19.
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implementing a beneficial ownership registry119 and, unsurprisingly, it is
an issue that many countries have faced.120
The expectation when a beneficial ownership registry is set up and
submission is required is that those with something to hide will lie. 121
After all, neither money launderers nor terrorist groups are strangers to
breaking the law and undertaking deception to cover their tracks, and
while sanctions are an integral part of the operation, they alone are not
substantial enough to deter bad actors if it is unlikely they will be caught.
Falsified beneficial ownership information is not easy to spot
without a due diligence mechanism in place. Take, for example, the
infamous Troika Laundromat scandal, where it was revealed that an
underground banking network had been used to funnel approximately
$8.8 billion through more than 70 offshore shell organizations.122 This
web allowed many to avoid restrictions by hiding their identities and
storing their assets overseas, facilitating money laundering.123 The
beneficial owner of a Panamanian company involved in many of these
transactions was none other than Armen Ustyan, a thirty-four-year-old
119. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING TECHNICAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
AML/CFT SYSTEMS 110-11 (2020), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
methodology/fatf%20methodology%2022%20feb%202013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RK7R-NWBN]; AMLD V, supra note 115, at Introduction, ¶ 22
(“Accurate identification and verification of data of natural and legal persons are essential
for fighting money laundering or terrorist financing.”). See also BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
TOOLKIT, supra note 4, at 22.
120. See, e.g., The Companies We Keep: What the UK’s Open Data Register Actually
Tells Us About Company Ownership, GLOB. WITNESS (July 2018), https://www.
globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/anonymouscompany-owners/companies-we-keep/#chapter-0/section-1
[https://perma.cc/Q8U6CY9X] [hereinafter The Companies We Keep] (finding that while the United Kingdom’s
register can assist in preventing money laundering, there are “significant issues with
ensuring data quality”); TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, G20 LEADERS OR LAGGARDS?
13 (2017) [hereinafter LEADERS OR LAGGARDS] (“Verification is weak across the
board.”).
121. Zosia Sztykowski & Chris Taggart, What We Really Mean When We Talk About
Verification (Part 1 of 4), OPEN OWNERSHIP (May 2017), https://www.openownership.
org/news/what-we-really-mean-when-we-talk-about-verification-part-1-of-4/
[https://perma.cc/B9LD-C6TA].
122. See Sophie Perryer, Troika Laundromat: Inside Europe’s Latest Money
Laundering Scandal, EUROPEANCEO (July 1, 2019), https://www.europeanceo.com/
finance/troika-laundromat-inside-europes-latest-money-laundering-scandal/
[https://perma.cc/KG4R-BVKC].
123. Id.
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seasonal construction worker who had no knowledge of the company and
received no benefit from its actions.124
Ustyan’s story is unfortunately not unique, and it provides a stark
example of the dangers of trusting data that has not been verified.125 Bad
actors will sometimes pay students or highly indebted persons a small
sum for their identities to open bank accounts.126 Thus, verification is
partially about ensuring accurate data, but on the assumption that the data
of bad actors is likely inaccurate, it is predominately about unearthing
suspicious information that might signal foul play.127
The CTA, at least in its current state, is missing this verification
mechanism.128 The statute is clear that FinCEN can implement policies to
verify accuracy,129 and there is a requirement that the Secretary and
Attorney General conduct a study to ensure the veracity of the
information,130 but there is no specific mention of strategies to promote
accuracy and uncover falsehoods. While the access allowed to financial
institutions for CDD purposes could potentially catch some transgressors,
the customer consent requirement permits bad actors to withhold consent
and try their luck elsewhere.131 Therefore, it is imperative to the
effectiveness of the CTA that a verification strategy be articulated and
implemented. While there are many options, it is also important to tailor
whatever method chosen to the needs of the United States and the
foundation already in place. This Note will now examine the most
suggested and implemented proposals and consider how they work in
tandem with the United States’ current regulatory framework.

124. Maíra Martini, Verifying the Beneficial Owner of Companies. Why and How.,
VOICES FOR TRANSPARENCY (Mar. 19, 2019), https://voices.transparency.org/verifyingthe-beneficial-owner-of-companies-why-and-how-d6e24bd9f99f
[https://archive.is/20hLY].
125. Id.
126. ANDRES KNOBEL, BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP VERIFICATION: ENSURING THE
TRUTHFULNESS AND ACCURACY OF REGISTERED OWNERSHIP INFORMATION 40 (2019),
https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Beneficial-ownershipverification_Tax-Justice-Network_Jan-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG78-5XAV].
127. Sztykowski & Taggart, supra note 121.
128. See supra Section I.C. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5336.
129. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(4)(B)(ii), (d)(2), (d)(3)(C).
130. See Corporate Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6502(b).
131. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2)(B).
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A REVIEW OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
There are some effective practices that the CTA already implements,
including ongoing reporting requirements,132 e-filing procedures that
constrain certain fields,133 and penalties for failure to comply.134 However,
to be in accordance with international AML standards, more needs to be
done to ensure data accuracy. There is a concern that such thorough
verification is not possible. In testimony before the Senate Banking
Committee in 2019, then-FinCEN Director Kenneth Blanco responded to
a question on the topic, saying “if what you’re asking us to do is verify
the information, I’ll just be candid with you: that would be a big mistake.
There would be no way that FinCEN could verify that information.”135
Despite this bleak outlook on the feasibility of data verification, experts
are in agreement that it is imperative to an effective beneficial owner
database.136
Solutions vary, and it is critical to understand the implications of
each one, how they interplay with other factors, and whether any would
be feasible and effective in the United States. A good place to start is with
an examination of the strategies suggested by nonprofit organizations and
implemented by governments across the world; the most popular methods
have been grouped into the following categories: (1) a publicly available
beneficial ownership registry; (2) requiring proof of identity and proof of
ownership; (3) cross-referencing the database information using internal
governmental or external sources; (4) a red-flagging system; and (5)
sample testing. While these are distinct methods, they often overlap and
132.
133.

See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(D). See also BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 40.
See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 86 Fed. Reg.
17,557, 17,563 (Apr. 5, 2021) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010). See also Data, OPEN
OWNERSHIP, https://www.openownership.org/guide/data/ [https://perma.cc/ZD3AHELG] [hereinafter Data].
134. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336. See also BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 15.
135. Combating Illicit Financing by Anonymous Shell Companies Through the
Collection of Beneficial Ownership Information: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 116th Cong. 1:27:53 (2019) (testimony of Kenneth Blanco,
former FinCEN Director), https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/combating-illicitfinancing-by-anonymous-shell-companies-through-the-collection-of-beneficialownership-information [https://perma.cc/4H22-9TEN].
136. LEADERS OR LAGGARDS, supra note 120, at 9; KNOBEL, supra note 126, at 2;
OPEN OWNERSHIP, VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA 2 (2020),
https://www.openownership.org/uploads/OpenOwnership%20Verification%20Briefing.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9W4Q-Q2TD] [hereinafter VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP DATA].
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complement each other, and thus the lines between them are not always
strictly delineated.
1. A Publicly Available Beneficial Ownership Registry
Although the CTA states that the beneficial ownership database is
not to be made public,137 because this option has been consistently
recommended by watchdog organizations and recently required under the
AMLD V, it should receive some consideration.
The basic proposal for a beneficial ownership database is outlined by
the FATF under the so-called “registry approach,” which tracks the
beneficial ownership registry in the CTA.138 The FATF recommends that
basic information about the company be made publicly available.139 Then,
beneficial ownership information could be made publicly available or,
instead, limited accessibility could be provided to financial institutions
and designated non-financial business or professionals (“DNFBP”).140
FATF acknowledges that while technological advances may allow
beneficial ownership information to be made publicly available, such a
course would need to be balanced with privacy concerns.141 Some groups
go a step further than the FATF proposal, advocating that the public
should have access to beneficial ownership data without barriers.142
137.
138.

See Corporate Transparency Act, § 6402(7)(A).
See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 24. DNFBPs vary based on jurisdiction
but generally include auditors, lawyers, notaries, trusts, and other professionals. What are
DNBFBPs?: What You Need to Know, COMPLY ADVANTAGE, https://complyadvantage.
com/knowledgebase/anti-money-laundering/designated-non-financial-businessesprofessions/ [https://perma.cc/4VKD-XYU8] (last visited Oct. 23, 2021).
139. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 24.
140. Id.
141. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 21
(2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-transparencybeneficial-ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/59D4-29X7].
142. See OPEN OWNERSHIP, BRIEFING: THE CASE FOR PUBLIC BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
REGISTERS 2 (2017), https://www.openownership.org/uploads/the-case-for-publicbeneficial-ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4XH-YKHH]. Some countries have
purportedly public databases but have some bar that make them less than truly public,
like payment for access, identification requirements, collection of data on those
searching, and only being searchable by obscure identification codes. See also Patchy
Progress in Setting Up Public Beneficial Ownership Registers in the EU, GLOB. WITNESS
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-moneylaundering/anonymous-company-owners/5amld-patchy-progress/
[https://perma.cc/L87F-KBPA] [hereinafter Patchy Progress].
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This sort of openly public database has begun to creep into
legislation, albeit slowly and with resistance. In 2016, the United
Kingdom introduced the Persons with Significant Control (PSC) register,
one of the first public registries of beneficial ownership information. 143
The AMLD V, implemented in 2020, requires that member states make
their UBOs accessible to the public.144 However, as of March 2020,
Global Witness found that only five out of twenty-seven E.U. members,
plus the United Kingdom, had implemented free-to-access public
registers.145
Proponents for a public beneficial ownership database argue that
such access has numerous benefits in the fight to deter money laundering
and terrorist financing. First, by granting public access, governments
allow members of the public, non-profit organizations focused on AML
and anti-terrorism efforts, and the press the opportunity to scrutinize the
information.146 This fosters public trust in the integrity of the financial
system and provides another source for finding discrepancies that could
lead to bad actors, thereby improving data quality.147 For example, Global
Witness analyzed the Companies House148 data and while it did not
discover any criminal wrongdoing, it did identify errors because it was
able to access the database.149 A public register can also enhance the speed
and efficiency by which financial institutions, domestic government
authorities, and international government authorities can obtain
143. GLOBAL WITNESS & OPEN OWNERSHIP, LEARNING THE LESSONS FROM THE UK’S
PBO PUBLIC BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REGISTER 2 (2017), https://www.openownership.
org/uploads/learning-the-lessons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8UWP-FQPG]
[hereinafter
LEARNING LESSONS]. The United Kingdom removed a small paywall in 2015 which has
caused use to grow exponentially from six million searches in 2014 through 2015 to two
billion searches per year. Nienke Palstra, 10 Lessons from the UK’s Public Register of
the Real Owners of Companies, GLOB. WITNESS (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.
globalwitness.org/en/blog/10-lessons-uks-public-register-real-owners-companies/
[https://perma.cc/3TGP-HBWQ].
144. AMLD V, supra note 115, at Introduction ¶33, art. 1 ¶15(c); supra Section I.D.
145. Patchy Progress, supra note 142. Five other Members have a centralized register
which is available to the public but with significant restrictions that hinder its usefulness.
Id. 17 out of 27 Member States do not have a register available to the public, but this is a
broad category that covers a variety of situations. Id.
146. AMLD V, supra note 115, at Introduction ¶30.
147. Id.; Sufficient Data Should Be Freely Accessible to the Public, OPEN OWNERSHIP
(July 2021) https://www.openownership.org/principles/public-access/ [https://perma.cc/
ACM2-NN93] [hereinafter Sufficient Data].
148. The U.K. organization that houses the beneficial ownership database.
149. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 51.
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information to help with their own AML efforts.150 Open Ownership
maintains that if beneficial ownership data is public, it can reduce the cost
and complexity associated with private sector CDD, leveling the playing
field.151
However, there is also evidence that public databases are not as
useful as leaked materials, such as the Panama Papers,152 which tend to
have more information with higher specificity.153 Some commentators
observed that “there is a great deal of misplaced confidence in the value
of public registers.”154 Rebutting this argument, the Tax Justice Network
contends that the pressure that arises from public scrutiny is undervalued,
and cases like the Panama Papers could be more easily detected if the
public were given the tools to question the veracity of beneficial
ownership information.155
The predominant concern with public beneficial ownership registers
is privacy. Prior to AMLD V and its public UBO registry requirement,
the European Data Protection Supervisor released an opinion warning that
the proposed measure posed a “significant and unnecessary risk for the
individual rights to privacy and data protection.”156 This is particularly
150. See AMLD V, supra note 115, at Introduction ¶30. See also Sufficient Data,
supra note 147.
151. See Sufficient Data, supra note 147.
152. In 2016, a whistleblower leaked more than eleven-and-a-half million documents
containing information on more than 210,000 offshore entities from the Panamanian law
firm, Mossack Fonseca. See Panama Papers Q&A: What Is the Scandal About?, BCC
(Apr. 6, 2016) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-35954224 [https://perma.cc/BTV5YY6U]. After a thorough investigative report, it was revealed that the firm’s clients,
many of them wealthy and high-profile individuals, were using shell companies to dodge
taxes, avoid sanctions, and launder money. Id. It is considered one of the largest and most
significant data leaks in history. Id.
153. See TOM KEATINGE & ANTON MOISEIENKO, FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? REFRAMING
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE AROUND USERS’ NEEDS 24 (2020),
https://static.rusi.org/243_ubo_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX3W-T8LP].
154. Id. at 25.
155. See Knobel, FATF Beneficial Ownership Report Reveals Cutting-Edge
Verification Processes, Hesitates to Endorse Public Registries, TAX JUST. NETWORK
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.taxjustice.net/2019/11/27/fatf-beneficial-ownership-report
-reveals-cutting-edge-verification-processes-hesitates-to-endorse-public-registries/
[https://perma.cc/X88M-LUUW].
156. Paolo Panico, Are Public Registers of Beneficial Owners in Breach of the
GDPR?, IFC (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.ifcreview.com/articles/2019/april/are-publicregisters-of-beneficial-owners-in-breach-of-the-gdpr/ [ttps://perma.cc/Y62Y-PQMG]
(internal citations omitted).
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true for the European Union, which has to comply with the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), with some commentators arguing that
such a requirement is directly in breach of the expansive privacy statute.157
Those concerns are not unfounded. At the beginning of 2021, the Belgian
UBO register was taken offline for some time after the discovery of a data
breach.158
Privacy First, an independent foundation whose aim is to preserve
privacy rights,159 initiated legal action against the Dutch government
seeking an injunction against its registry.160 The foundation, relying on
the GDPR and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, believed that
the outcome of the litigation would be positive for them, noting that the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had already invalidated
similar legislation for privacy concerns.161 However, on March 18, 2021,
the District Court of the Hague rejected Privacy First’s claim but
“expressed its doubts as to the legitimacy of the (partly) public nature of
the UBO-register.”162 The Court did not want to make a decision that
would require the Netherlands to defy AMLD V before it had ruled on the
Directive’s legitimacy.163 A similar case is pending in Luxembourg.164
Public database proponents acknowledge the importance of privacy
and data protection, and admit that striking a balance between these
interests and transparency will require a nuanced look at what is being

157.
158.

Id.
Pleuni Visser et al., Netherlands: Court Doubts the Legitimacy of The Dutch
UBO-Register, MONDAQ (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.mondaq.com/corporate-andcompany-law/1059854/court-doubts-the-legitimacy-of-the-dutch-ubo-register
[https://perma.cc/CUM9-SJLK].
159. See About Privacy First, PRIVACY FIRST, https://www.privacyfirst.eu/
[https://perma.cc/4QDQ-96KF].
160. Privacy First Initiates Court Case to Dispel Privacy-Violating UBO Register,
PRIVACY FIRST, (Jan. 6, 2021), https://privacyfirst.eu/court-cases/691-privacy-firstinitiates-court-case-to-dispel-privacy-violating-ubo-register.html
[https://perma.cc/56ZW-C2VK].
161. Id. For example, the CJEU found that data retention requirements in the national
security laws of France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, which would have made
providers of electronic communications services retain traffic and location data on a
general and indiscriminate basis, were unlawful. See End of the EU’s Data Retention
Saga? CJEU Clarifies Conditions for State Surveillance Regimes, JONES DAY (Oct.
2020),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/10/cjeu-clarifies-conditions-forstate-surveillance-regimes [https://perma.cc/J53D-NGMZ].
162. Visser et al., supra note 158.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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published, whose data is being published, and how it is being published.165
However, they also proffer that these rights are not absolute and that
privacy compromises are already made every day.166 One suggestion to
mitigate the drawbacks of a public database is using case-by-case
exemptions where individuals can apply to not have their information
published.167 In the United Kingdom, for instance, one can file for an
exemption where he or she can provide evidence proving, “a serious risk
of violence or intimidation due to the nature of their company’s
operations.”168
2. Requiring Proof of Identity and Proof of Ownership
Requiring some proof of identification for the beneficial owner
allows the government to further ensure that the beneficial owner is a real
person and is who the owner claims to be.169 In Denmark, beneficial
owners are required to submit a scanned copy of their passport or other
national identification, which is argued to be reasonable because proof of
identification is needed to open a bank account.170 This method raises the
stakes, as bad actors not only have to undertake falsifying convincing
documents that may tip off authorities,171 but they also have to risk
incurring additional sanctions for forgery.
More rigorous forms of identification could be required such as
biometric data (fingerprints and eye retina scans), or potentially
165. OPEN OWNERSHIP ET AL., DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY IN BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE 29-30 (2019), https://www.openownership.org/uploads/oodata-protection-and-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBG4-7TE4].
166. Id. at 30-31. For example, most countries require political candidates to disclose
personal details. Id. Section 885 of the NDAA, the very same law where the CTA resides,
requires the beneficial ownership registry of federal government contractors and grantees
(“FAPIIS”) to be publicly available. See Neil Gordon, The U.S. Just Created a Public
Beneficial Ownership Registry for a Subset of Companies, POGO (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2021/03/the-u-s-just-created-a-public-beneficialownership-registry-for-a-subset-of-companies/ [https://perma.cc/CD2Y-D7R8].
167. See OPEN OWNERSHIP ET AL., supra note 165, at 38-39. See also LEARNING
LESSONS, supra note 143, at 5; Keatinge & Moiseienko, supra note 153, at 6.
168. LEARNING LESSONS, supra note 143, at 5. In the first six months of the register,
over one million U.K. companies filed with the registry; of those, 270 individuals applied
for this exemption, and only five of those have been granted. Id.
169. See Data, supra note 133; KNOBEL, supra note 126, at 37.
170. The Companies We Keep, supra note 120, at 27.
171. Id. at 27-28.
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employing new anti-fraud techniques, such as tracking IP addresses to
ensure that the computer is in the country the beneficial owner claims to
be from.172 If more traditional forms of identification are used, like
passports or driver’s licenses, it is recommended that the government
agency tries to arrange a meeting in person or over video call to aid in
verification.173
This method could also be narrowed to apply to only higher-risk
cases. Namely, “[i]n some countries, where the [beneficial owner] is not
a local citizen, the registry authority requires the applicant to proffer a
certified copy of the passport and [] certificate of incorporation for legal
persons.”174 In other nations, there is reliance on either obliged parties or
official representatives from the applicant’s home to certify the
information provided.175
Regardless of the route taken, staff from whichever department or
agency the beneficial ownership registry is housed will likely need
supplementary training on how to assess the veracity of identification
documents.176
3. Cross-Referencing Beneficial Ownership Data
Another potential solution is to cross-reference the beneficial
ownership data either internally with other government databases, or
externally with financial institutions or professional organizations. Using
a supplementary information platform to assist in verification ensures that
the data submitted is the same across all registries and raises red flags if
it is not.177 This is what the FATF calls the “existing information
approach,” which it recommends pairing with the registry approach for
greater assurances of accuracy.178
a. Intragovernmental Cross-Checking
Intragovernmental cross-checking relies on information that has
already been gathered by other governmental authorities to ensure that the
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

KNOBEL, supra note 126, at 37.
Id.
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 52.
Id.
VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 6.
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 37, 44; The Companies We Keep, supra note
120, at 28; Keatinge & Moiseienko, supra note 153, at 23.
178. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 11, 21-22.

222

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

data provided to the beneficial ownership registry is, in fact, correct.179
Depending on the country, the database could be compared to a tax
authority, law enforcement, or land register database, as well as other
internal sources.180 In France, for example, clerks handle the verification
of information on their own and then cross-check it with the Trade
Register,181 the main database of all companies registered in France.182
China, too, cross-checks beneficial ownership information against at least
seven other government registries.183
In the United States, FinCEN could turn to its fellow Treasury
Department bureau, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to compare the
beneficial ownership information submitted. Internal Revenue Code §
6103(h) authorizes the IRS to enter into agreements with governmental
agencies to share tax information for tax administration purposes, an
umbrella under which money laundering prevention would likely fall.184
Or, if other identification verification strategies are used,185 such as
fingerprinting, FinCEN could use the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(“IAFIS”).186 The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) could also provide useful
information by cross-referencing the address provided with their records,
to see if the location is feasible.187

179. Id. at 44. This is similar to the recommendation that FinCEN makes for financial
institutions trying to strengthen their CDD policies, proposing that, “AML staff may find
it useful to cross-check for beneficial ownership information in data systems maintained
within the financial institution for other purposes, such as credit underwriting, marketing,
or fraud detection.” FINCEN ET AL., JOINT RELEASE, GUIDANCE ON OBTAINING AND
RETAINING BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION 2 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/
other/2010/34-61651-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VXT-T6S6].
180. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 44.
181. Id. at 49.
182. The French Trade Registry, CO. FORMATION FR., https://www.company
formationfrance.com/trade-registry-france [https://perma.cc/XQE7-CLAP] (last updated
Jan. 16, 2020).
183. VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 5.
184. I.R.C. § 6103(h).
185. See supra Section II.A.2.
186. See generally Privacy Impact Assessment Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System National Security Enhancements, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION
(Apr. 25, 2021), https://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/privacyimpact-assessments/iafis [https://perma.cc/ZC6F-9SYZ].
187. VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 4.
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If cross-checking within the government, an automatic control
among the relevant databases could be developed to verify information as
it is submitted.188 Denmark, by way of example, has a common portal that
automatically checks information filed with various government
registers.189 Even if the system is not as streamlined as Denmark’s, it
would still provide a valuable opportunity to ensure that information is
correct.
b. Private Database Cross-Checking
Aside from, or in conjunction with, cross-checking within the
government, another method of review relies on using the information
gathered from private entities.190 There has been success in this strategy:
Spain has three separate beneficial ownership databases, each comprised
of information collected by different obliged entities.191 One is from
notaries, another is submitted by an authorized representative of the
company, and the third is derived from credit institutions.192 The
overlapping nature of the databases allows for verification across
industries in Spain.193 Information could also be gathered from nonobliged entities, such as Google Maps, to ensure that a certain address or
zip code aligns with the type of address given (home, business, etc.),
serving as the extra-governmental mirror to the USPS function.194
In some countries, in order to complete company registration, one
must open a bank account with a financial institution, triggering the
bank’s CDD processes.195 If preservation of a bank account throughout
the life of the legal entity was mandatory, it could enhance the
maintenance of accurate and up-to-date information by utilizing the
financial institution’s “ability to periodically refresh customer files or
identify when changes” are made.196
A ready solution in the United States comes from the BSA and its
already-in-place CDD requirements for financial institutions.197 As
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 44.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 39-40.
Id.
Id.
VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 4.
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 31.
Id.
See supra Section I.B.
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outlined above, under CDD requirements, financial institutions must
identify and verify their customers and obtain the beneficial ownership
information of companies opening accounts.198 Not only is this another
source of beneficial ownership information, it also means that financial
institutions already have mechanisms in place to try and assure accuracy,
compounding its usefulness. While the CTA requires customer consent
when financial institutions ask to retrieve customer information from the
beneficial owner registry, the same would not necessarily be true the other
way around.199 After all, when a financial institution files a SAR, it is not
allowed to notify anyone involved in the transaction.200 By and large, as
two commentators note “this principle is wholly unobjectionable” as long
as there are “appropriate channels for reporting discrepancies.”201
4. A Red-Flagging System
Another form of verification, generally paired with other methods, is
a red-flagging system that is set up to catch patterns indicative of
suspicious activity.202 Such indications could be: submission of the same
credit card or email address for multiple entities; whether the level of
assets matches the average for the claimed industry; whether the entity
has a high level of assets despite being a few hours old; whether it is a
foreign entity incorporated in a tax haven; and any other such qualities
that might suggest illicit activity.203 Despite supporting the United
Kingdom’s public beneficial ownership database, Global Witness
suggests that Companies House develop a red-flag system, ideally
implementing data science to create an automated approach.204 For
example, a Ukrainian working group proposed a verification system
based on locally-known techniques for avoiding beneficial ownership

198. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg.
29,398, 29,398 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024,
1026).
199. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2)(B).
200. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2).
201. Keatinge & Moiseienko, supra note 153, at 23. However, this same paper asks,
then, what is the benefit of such a registry? Id.
202. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 44; VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
DATA, supra note 136, at 8.
203. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 44; KNOBEL, supra note 126, at 48.
204. The Companies We Keep, supra note 120, at 29.
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detection.205 There, factory workers are commonly listed as the beneficial
owners of wealthy entities.206 The proffered system would raise a red-flag
when tax data shows that someone listed as a beneficial owner of a
profitable company makes significantly less money than would be
expected.207
Red-flag programs have been successfully implemented in several
countries. For example, in Austria, the entity that keeps the beneficial
ownership registry is responsible for the accuracy of the data.208 To do
this, the entity’s information is cross-referenced with information from
available sources and, if it is determined that there is something wrong
with the entity (either incompleteness or falsity), it is flagged.209
Because red-flagging systems are intended to catch context-specific
patterns, they are most easily implemented within a digitized system
where the beneficial ownership information is open data.210 This type of
set-up would ideally allow for the utilization of artificial intelligence (AI)
and machine learning technology.211 However, the time and financial
investment in a system that uses AI and machine learning can be a barrier
for implementation.212 Further, for every additional category or database
utilized in the red-flagging system, there is an increased likelihood of
entries being incorrectly flagged as suspicious, which would decrease the
usefulness of the mechanism.213 If this path is chosen, it will be imperative
to examine the processes involved and enact protocols that address such
disparities.214
5. Sample Testing
Some registries use a technique known as sample testing—randomly
pulling submissions and comparing them with the information in public
and non-public sources—to confirm data accuracy and monitor how

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 9.
Id.
Id.
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 45-46.
Id.
Data, supra note 133.
VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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much correct or incorrect data the registry is receiving.215 By pulling
samples of the data and scrutinizing the information therein, government
agencies can furnish a powerful deterrent against those willing to risk
submitting false information.216 Denmark has successfully put into
practice a form of sample testing that accurately identifies suspicious
entries.217
However, an important complaint about sample testing is that it is
not “very effective” and can require a lot of resources for
implementation.218 In light of these drawbacks, countries should use a
“risk-based approach” when administering sample testing.219 Similar to
the method requiring proof of identity and ownership for foreign
beneficial owners, sample testing could also be tailored to focus on risk
factors,220 such as whether the beneficial owner or entity originates from
a country with weaker identification regulations. As demonstrated above,
inclusion of risk factors will likely be most effective if the data is gathered
by locale.221
B. METHODS IN COMBINATION AND THE TAX JUSTICE NETWORK
PROPOSAL
Although each strategy has merit on its own, the FATF has found
that the most effective beneficial ownership registries are those that
combine multiple approaches.222 A proposal by the Tax Justice Network
embodies this principle by suggesting a multi-step proposal that touches
on many of the above-described methods.223 This strategy for data
verification works in three steps.224 The first requires the relevant data to
be collected and, ideally, backed up with certain assurances: a digital
signature, finger print or retinal scan, or scanned copies of national
identification, as well as signed statements attesting to the validity of the
215. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 45. See also Keatinge & Moiseienko,
supra note 153, at 10.
216. VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 7.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
222. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 8.
223. KNOBEL, supra note 126, at 2-3.
224. Id.
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information, to name a few.225 The second step is akin to the crossreferencing function, requiring an automatic IT system to take the
information provided and check that it is consistent with existing data in
government databases.226 The submitted data would also be compared to
records outside the government, so that, for example, a listed business
address is not, in reality, a local park, and a recently deceased person is
not the beneficial owner.227 This step also includes authenticating the
beneficial owner either through biometric data or a digital signature, or
simply by contacting the person at his or her official phone number or
email address (not the one submitted to the register), to make sure
someone’s identity was not stolen (or even voluntarily sold) in the
process.228 The last step is red-flagging, which requires “finding patterns
of legal vehicles’ structures and their owners . . . to confirm the
reasonableness of the declared data, even if it looks valid because it
matches government records.”229 This step utilizes big data to see if the
information is reflective of legitimate or illegitimate company structures,
as well as politically exposed persons and suspicious transactions.230
Thus, the different methods described work best in tandem, each
enhancing the effectiveness of the other. However, throwing the
proverbial kitchen sink of verification strategies at a beneficial ownership
register is not advisable and would likely frustrate all parties involved.
Instead, by understanding the various systems in play and tailoring them
to what is already in place, a balance can be struck between accuracy,
privacy, and burdensomeness.
III. MOVING FORWARD WITH THE CTA
The implementation of the CTA is still in its infancy; and with the
benefit of other countries’ experiences, there is an opportunity to hit the
ground running and develop a database that is truly worth the
inconvenience to law-abiding entities. This is not a peripheral issue, the
notice and comment period for regulations implementing the CTA
concluded on May 5, 2021 and the problem of data accuracy and

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

KNOBEL, supra note 126, at 35-38.
Id. at 2-3, 41-45.
Id.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 47-53.
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verification comes up repeatedly.231 The Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association (SIFMA), in particular, urges that “FinCEN should
utilize any and all verification mechanisms available, including from
other government agencies, and require reporting companies to supply
any missing data and address inconsistent data.”232 Other submissions to
FinCEN included requests for document verification,233 cross-referencing
with pre-existing databases,234 and automation of red flags,235 to name a
few.

231. Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 86 Fed. Reg.
17,557, 17,557 (proposed Apr. 5, 2021) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010).
232. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, at 4 (May
5, 2021), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0167 [https://
perma.cc/Y88E-NWU4].
233. See, e.g., London Stock Exchange Group, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on
Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, at 2 (May 5, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0158
[https://perma.cc/2WWV-2VKK]; Bank Policy Institute, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, at 4 (May 5, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0124
[https://perma.cc/KYP7-GLBP]. See also Fact Coalition, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, at 70-71 (May 5,
2021), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0142 [https://perma.
cc/YUH7-UTS9].
234. See, e.g., National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys, Comment
Letter on Proposed Rule on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements,
at 2 (May 5, 2021), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0123
[https://perma.cc/S2MQ-F3N3]. See also Global Financial Integrity, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, at 6-7
(May 5, 2021), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0198 [https:
//perma.cc/YGV8-JFBL]; RegTech Consulting LLC, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, at 52-53 (May 5, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0209
[https://perma.cc/TZT6-RPKH].
235. See, e.g., Alliance for Securing Democracy, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, at 3 (May 5, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0130
[https://perma.cc/6B29-E58F]; Project on Government Oversight, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule on Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, at 3 (May
5, 2021), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2021-0005-0108 [https://
perma.cc/7TP5-Y4G7].
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A. TACKLING THE DATA VERIFICATION PROBLEM
Considering the information reviewed, as FinCEN moves forward
with implementation, it should consider a mechanism similar to that
proposed by the Tax Justice Initiative, including a proof of identity
requirement and an internal, and ideally external, cross-referencing
structure, that would be supplemented by a red-flagging system.
1. Proof of Identity Requirement
Along with the other information requested, FinCEN should require
not only a unique identification number from a passport or driver’s
license, but also a certified copy of the corresponding document. The
CTA currently requires the submission of a unique identification number
from a passport, driver’s license, or a FinCEN identification number,
which can be requested from the agency.236 Although there are benefits to
some of the proof of identity measures outlined in Part II–biometric
methods, face-to-face meetings, or video calls–these would be impractical
and disproportionately burdensome measures to implement.237 Further,
while fingerprints could potentially be cross-referenced with the FBI’s
IAFIS database, the pool is much smaller than, for example, the IRS’ tax
information database.238
Instead, requesting a certified copy of the documentation from which
the unique identification number originates could balance the interests of
verification while not being overly onerous. It is both reasonable and easy
to request a certified copy of the identification documentation detailed
above; the same form of identification is required for a great variety of
activities, from opening a bank account, 239 to traveling, to applying to a
job. Certification adds an additional layer of protection because many

236.
237.
238.

31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(1)(A)-(D), (b)(3)(A).
See supra Part II.
According to the February 2021 FBI monthly fact sheet, IAFIS contains the
fingerprints of more than 155 million criminals and civil individuals. March 2021 Next
Generation Identification (NGI) System Fact Sheet, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ngi-monthly-fact-sheet/view
[https://perma.cc/D449-EX7F] (last visited, Apr. 25, 2021). For contrast, in 2019, the IRS
processed more than 253 million federal tax returns. See Returns Filed, Taxes Collected
& Refunds Issued, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/returnsfiled-taxes-collected-and-refunds-issued [https://perma.cc/L824-HB82] (last updated
Oct. 22, 2020).
239. The Companies We Keep, supra note 120, at 27.
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states require a notary to compare and verify the copy.240 Further, it is a
function familiar to the U.S. government, and necessitates more effort on
the part of bad actors who would need to falsify the documents
sufficiently to surpass scrutiny while risking additional forgery
sanctions.241 The decision could be made to use a risk-based approach, as
mentioned above in Section II.A.5, and only request documentation for
certain groups,242 but that could just push bad actors into shifting their
falsehoods to avoid the requirement. It makes the most sense to utilize a
blanket condition for all who are not exempt from the database.
However, the risk of forged documents cannot be ignored, both for
domestic materials and foreign documentation where there might be less
familiarity with identifying falsified materials. The latter concern could
be mitigated by requiring certification from a representative of the foreign
country.243 However, unless there is already infrastructure in place that
can be utilized to identify forgeries, there will need to be at least some
training concerning the veracity of documentation.244
Importantly, a dedicated money launderer with a large enough
network has the motive and means to have convincing fake identification
documents created, but this is a much broader problem with its own
complexities and regulatory challenges.245
2. Cross-Referencing Mechanism
Once the beneficial ownership information has made it into the
government’s database, there should also be automatic cross-referencing
mechanisms in place to verify the information. FinCEN is well positioned
240. David Thun, How to Certify a Copy of a Document, NAT’L NOTARY ASS’N (Apr.
9, 2014), https://www.nationalnotary.org/notary-bulletin/blog/2014/04/how-to-certifycopy-document [https://perma.cc/ULR6-2ADY].
241. See supra Section II.A.1; The Companies We Keep, supra note 120, at 27-28.
242. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 52-53.
243. Id.
244. VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 6.
245. See, e.g., Identity and Travel Document Fraud, INTERPOL, https://www.
interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-andtravel-document-fraud [https://perma.cc/E2CM-65RC] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022); Nigel
Lewis, Agents Struggle to Spot Fake Documents During Anti-Money Laundering
Checks, THE NEGOTIATOR (July 6, 2018), https://thenegotiator.co.uk/anti-moneylaundering-checks/ [https://perma.cc/ET3F-PRDH]; FINCEN, THE SAR ACTIVITY
REVIEW: TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 25 (2006), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/
files/sar_report/sar_tti_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLS3-VRB2].
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to utilize both internal government information and external data sources
to verify the beneficial ownership database due to its place in the
government and the cursory nature of the information requested under the
CTA.246
As discussed earlier, FinCEN could utilize the vast collection of
information retained by the IRS to spot any discrepancies.247 The IRS is
very likely already authorized to share such information with FinCEN, as
money laundering is synonymous with tax evasion.248 Although other
databases, such as the FBI’s fingerprint database could be used as a crossreference, they might require additional information (like fingerprints or
retina scans) and would likely be far more limited.249 The IRS database
contains similar, relevant information and is vast, making it an sensible
companion to the beneficial ownership registry.
The data that can be gathered from financial institutions provides
another excellent source of information because of their CDD
requirements.250 The BSA already requires financial institutions to
reasonably believe that the information they are receiving is correct,
creating another layer of verification.251 Further, under the BSA, financial
institutions are required to keep the information retrieved in a database
where it can be pulled upon law enforcement request.252 Thus, both the
information and the legality of the exchange are firmly in place for an
effective cross-referencing tool; the query then turns to how this process
should be conducted.
Information gathered from both internal and external crossreferencing would benefit from a central, private, registry programmed to
do automatic checks as data is received. For the intelligence gathered
from governmental sources, a central database within the government
would allow for automatic checking that could be done upon the intake of
information. Or, if FinCEN decides to employ a spot-checking
mechanism, although it is not recommended here, certain entries could be
marked for the spot-checking process, and the first step could be crossreferencing with the governmental data. The former would be preferable
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv)(II); KNOBEL, supra note 126, at 36-37.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 6103(h); supra Section II.A.3.a.
See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 52.
Id. at 37.
Cohen & Gresser LLP, supra note 45.
Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg.
29,398, 29,398 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024,
1026).
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as it would mean that every entry had gone through some sort of check,
but the latter would be less burdensome to implement.
For private institutions, the process could either require a first step
from FinCEN or the financial institution. FinCEN could require entities
to submit, along with their other information, the financial institutions
with which they have accounts. FinCEN could then reach out to those
institutions, request the information, and require that they update FinCEN
when there are changes. In contrast, it could be mandated that the
financial institution submit the beneficial ownership information for all
non-exempt entities to a portal where it could easily be collated. This
would provide the benefit of determining who did not permit their
information to be sent in, which could be a good place to begin the redflagging process.
Alternatively, the financial institution could either reach out to
clients to inquire about exemption status or provide a general notice that
any customers exempted from the CTA should reach out to them before
a certain date, at which point they would send the information en masse.
These tasks could be done by a person, but there would be more time and
opportunity for error; a digital infrastructure would aid in more effectively
implementing all the precautions suggested here.
3. Red-Flagging System
FinCEN should also consider, at least initially, a simple red-flag
system that relies on basic data pattern-recognition. While the sort of redflag infrastructure described by the Tax Justice Initiative would be
comprehensive and useful, it also requires significant data scaffolding.253
Instead, a red-flag system which focuses on less-complex patterns that are
easier for a system to discern, with a clear delineation when it comes to
reporting entries for review, is a good place to start. Automatic flags for
the multiple entries with the same identification number, address, email,
or phone number, for example, are a straightforward and effective way to
determine if something nefarious is transpiring. This strikes a balance
between discouraging bad actors and implementing a new, expensive, and
complicated infrastructure.

253.

KNOBEL, supra note 126, at 47.
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B. REJECTED MECHANISMS
Although each has utility and merit in the data verification process,
employing a public database and using spot-checking are not
recommended at this time.
1. Public Database
While the AMLDs and transparency watchdogs both recommend a
public beneficial ownership database to assist in the verification of data,
for the potential privacy issues involved, the benefits are not totally
proven.254 While there are several apparent benefits—providing
information to the press and nonprofits, fostering public trust, putting
pressure on entities, and enhancing the speed at which law enforcement
agencies can access the data—the drawbacks are forceful enough to curb
a recommendation.255 As mentioned in Section II.A.1, the very general
information provided by databases is not often useful to those who might
peruse it for discrepancies.256 Further, there has already been a data breach
with the Belgian UBO register that required it to be temporarily taken
offline.257 And, importantly, the CJEU has expressed skepticism over the
public UBO registry, 258 and a FinCEN public registry could face similar
challenges here. In light of the other options available to FinCEN, until
there is more clarity on the legality of a public registry, there is no cause
to recommend a public database.
2. Sample Testing
Finally, while sample testing can be a good resource for verification,
balancing its effectiveness with the cost of its implementation is a
challenge.259 The significant number of entities would make it difficult to

254.
255.

See supra Section II.A.1.
See supra Section II.A.1; AMLD V, supra note 115 at Introduction ¶ 30;
Sufficient Data, supra note 147; Best Practices, supra note 15, at 51; Knobel, supra note
155.
256. See supra Section II.A.1. See also Keatinge & Moiseienko, supra note 153, at
24; Visser et al., supra note 158.
257. See supra Section II.A.1. See also Keatinge & Moiseienko, supra note 153, at
24; Visser et al., supra note 158.
258. See Visser et al., supra note 158.
259. See supra Section II.A.5. See also VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
DATA, supra note 136, at 7.
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sample test without some careful, risk-based factors.260 There are,
however, good options for factors, including where the beneficial owner
claims to be from, or even the state the entity is incorporated in, so as to
target those locales that will turn a blind eye to malfeasance. But, again,
in light of the associated costs, there are better ways to engage in data
verification.
CONCLUSION
The story of this paper is both familiar and foreign; flashy apartments
hiding international secrets is likely no big surprise to the average
person.261 What happens next might not be so well-known. That these
sorts of transactions ultimately spurred FinCEN to initiate the GTOs that
are still in place at the time of writing, and that the data from those GTOS
highlights the usefulness of and need for beneficial ownership
regulations.262 That the CTA sprung from this bedrock with the goal of
enhancing the fortifications against global money laundering. That its
proper implementation requires for there to be a method for data
verification so that the information submitted can be put to work and
further FinCEN’s goals. Maybe this plotline is less dazzling, but it is
imperative to the success of the United States’ AML efforts.
There is also no need for panic or dismay from the real estate
industry. As Terri Adler, managing partner and real estate chair at the law
firm Duval & Stachenfeld commented, “[a]s long as the regulations and
privacy to the information make sense and work, it will not stop investors
from coming here.”263 The recommendations outlined in this Note–a
proof of identity requirement, a cross-referencing mechanism, and a red
flag system-are intended to strike this balance, justifying the relative
inconvenience of complying with the beneficial ownership registry with
the implementations of rules that will support effective AML and antiterrorism efforts.

260.
261.
262.
263.

VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP DATA, supra note 136, at 7.
See Story & Saul, supra note 12. See generally WRIGHT & HOPE, supra note 1
See supra Section I.C.3.
See Larsen, supra note 5.

RETURNING TO THE STATUTORY TEXT: WHY
THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 13(B) REQUIRES
COURTS TO NARROWLY CONSTRUE THE FTC’S
ABILITY TO OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Christopher Halm*
ABSTRACT
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces over 70 laws in the
areas of antitrust and consumer protection, and one valuable tool to
support their enforcement is Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“Section 13(b)”). Section 13(b), among other
features, grants the FTC authority to seek an injunction in district
court against any defendant that is “about to violate” one or more of
those laws. For the past three decades, courts have adopted a
permissive judicial interpretation of that language, authorizing
injunctions against defendants when the allegedly impending
violations were only “likely to recur” based on past misconduct. This
is known as the “likelihood of recurrence” standard.
Recently, the Third Circuit’s holding in FTC v. Shire Viropharma,
Inc. potentially upends the longstanding dominance of that
permissive judicial interpretation. Shire found that the “likelihood of
recurrence” standard was incompatible with the statutory text of
Section 13(b). In particular, the court found that the phrase “about to
violate” sets a benchmark for seeking injunctive relief that is higher
than the “likelihood of recurrence” standard. In other words, for the
FTC to seek injunctive relief, the alleged violation needs to truly be
about to occur rather than merely likely to occur.
An examination of the plain meaning and congressional intent,
which can be discerned from the legislative history, of Section 13(b)
shows that the statute does indeed set a standard for awarding
injunctive relief that is higher than the “likelihood of recurrence”
standard. Namely, Section 13(b) requires that future violations be
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imminent or impending–not merely likely–for injunctive relief to be
granted. Since the “likelihood of recurrence” test does not comport
with the plain meaning or congressional intent of the statute, courts
should no longer use it when determining if a defendant is “about to
violate” the law. Instead, courts should undertake an analysis that is
true to the text, and carefully and properly consider whether future
violations are genuinely about to occur.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—founded over a hundred
years ago during the Progressive Era—was once largely toothless.1 That
began to change in the 1970s when the bipartisan agency was given
greater authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)
to enforce its findings by obtaining injunctive relief for consumers in
1.

See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
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federal court.2 That authority—codified in Section 13(b) of the FTC Act
(“Section 13(b)”)—states that
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that any person,
partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any
provision of law enforced by the [FTC] . . . the Commission by any
of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a
district court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice.3

The statutory language “is violating, or is about to violate” has
recently come under increased scrutiny.4 For decades, the broad judicial
construction of the phrase “about to violate” has greatly expanded the
scope of Section 13(b) and the ability of the FTC to employ the courts to
enforce consumer protections.5 Recently, however, the Third Circuit
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s expansive construction of the statute, which
had found that “likelihood of recurrence” satisfies the statute’s “about to
violate” standard.6
Like the Third Circuit, this Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation is unsupported by the text and congressional intent of
Section 13(b). Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to resolve this
split. If it follows the Third Circuit’s narrow construction of the statute,
the circumstances under which the FTC can seek injunctive relief from
district courts will be significantly reduced. Namely, the FTC may be
unable to seek injunctive relief against defendants whose violations have
ceased but are still likely to recur.
Part II of this Note examines the history of Section 13(b) and how
the “likelihood of recurrence” test became the judicial default. Part III
examines recent caselaw that challenges the predominance of the
“likelihood of recurrence” test. Part IV argues that, in determining
whether to grant injunctive relief against a defendant, the “likelihood of
recurrence” test is unfaithful to the statutory text and congressional
intent of Section 13(b).

2.
3.
4.
5.

See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
See discussion infra Part III.
Specifically, its ability to pursue past violations. See discussion infra Section

II.B.2.
6. Compare FTC v. Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2019),
with FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985).
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II. SECTION 13(B) AND THE “LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE”
STANDARD
In response to concerns about the adequacy of the FTC’s
enforcement mechanisms, the 93rd Congress amended the FTC Act to
add Section 13(b).7 Section 13(b) grants the FTC the ability to seek
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and permanent
injunctions in district court, so long as the defendant “is violating” or “is
about to violate” any of the laws enforced by the agency.8 When the
FTC began using Section 13(b), many courts grappled with how to
determine whether the FTC had met its initial burden of showing that
the defendant is “about to violate” the law.9 Specifically, in cases where
a defendant had previously violated the law and the FTC alleged that it
was about to violate the law again, courts increasingly began to use the
“likelihood of recurrence” test.10 Under this standard, so long as the FTC
demonstrates that a past violation is “likely to recur,” the court will find
that the FTC has met its burden of showing that the defendant is “about
to violate” the law.11
Section II.A introduces the historical background and legislative
history that gave rise to Section 13(b). Section II.B then examines the
caselaw that led to the near-universal use of the “likelihood of
recurrence” test in cases where the FTC is alleging that a defendant is
“about to violate” the law.
A. THE CREATION OF SECTION 13(B)
As the administrative state grew dramatically in the 1970s, weak
enforcement mechanisms constrained the FTC and commentators
criticized the agency for its correspondingly lackluster efforts to protect
7.
8.

See discussion infra Section II.A.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b). Note that the language of Section
13(b) encompasses only ongoing or future violations (“is violating or is about to
violate”), not past violations. See also AMG Cap. Mgmt. v. FTC, No. 19-508, 2021
U.S. LEXIS 2108, at *1348 (Apr. 22, 2021). Nonetheless, the FTC often pursues past
violations under Section 13(b) anyway, with great success, by alleging that the past
violator “is about to violate” the law again and must be enjoined. See discussion infra
Section II.B.2.
9. See discussion infra Section II.B.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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consumers.12 For decades, the FTC had been limited to enforcing its
laws through a process known as administrative adjudication.13
Unfortunately, this wholly-internal process was slow, burdensome, and
did little to remedy illegal conduct.14
1. The Historical Basis for Section 13(b)
When the FTC was founded in the early 1900s, lawmakers were
mainly concerned with the rise of monopolies, cartels, and other anticompetitive actors.15 In response, Congress passed the FTC Act, which
prohibited anti-competitive conduct and tasked the FTC with policing
such violations.16 A little over twenty years later, an increase in
consumer frauds spurred further expansion of the FTC’s jurisdiction to
cover frauds and deception against consumers.17 To that end, Congress
amended the FTC Act in 1938 to ban “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices,” giving the FTC sole jurisdiction to police such violations. 18
Despite such wide mandates to police anti-competitive conduct and
consumer fraud, Congress only granted the FTC limited remedies to

12. See EDWARD F. COX ET AL., THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 66-73 (1969) (describing the cease-and-desist remedy as inadequate and
criticizing FTC enforcement as inconsistent and haphazard).
13. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)).
14. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591
(1973) (noting that the current system of administrative adjudication hampers the FTC’s
investigative and law enforcement functions); REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO
STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 62-64 (1969), reprinted in 1 J. REPRINTS FOR
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 885, 952-54 (1969) (addressing inadequacy of then-existing
remedies for FTC Act violations).
15. See Woodrow Wilson, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on
Additional Legislation for the Control of Trusts and Monopolies (Jan. 20, 1914), H.R.
Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914) (arguing that legislative action needed to be
taken against detrimental monopolies).
16. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. at 719.
17. See Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act: Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
1139, 1157 (1992) (noting the need “to address a national crisis in the advertising and
sale of drugs and devices that could endanger health”).
18. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (amending the
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)).
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carry out these mandates.19 Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, whenever
the FTC uncovered anti-competitive conduct or consumer fraud, the
foremost remedy was to issue “an order requiring such person,
partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method
of competition or such act or practice.”20 The only way to issue this
cease and desist order was for the FTC to initiate litigation through an
internal administrative adjudication process.21 If, at the end of that
adjudication, an administrative law judge found that there were
violations of the law, he could then issue a cease and desist order.22
The problem with this approach was that the internal adjudicative
process was slow and the cease and desist remedy was not a particularly
effective deterrent against violators.23 First, an administrative
adjudication could take years.24 Second, while that process played out,
there was nothing to stop the defendant from continuing to engage in the
anti-competitive or fraudulent conduct.25 For instance, a defendant could
continue its process of acquiring a company even if the FTC was suing
to block the acquisition on antitrust grounds.26 Likewise, a defendant
accused of scamming consumers via false advertisements could continue
to run them up until the moment a final decision was rendered.27 Third,
if a party was ultimately found liable, a cease and desist order was not a
particularly formidable remedy, because the FTC could not seek a

19. Id. at 114-15. The only limited exception, at the time, involved false
advertisements for “food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.” Only in those such cases could
the FTC seek a different remedy: litigation in federal district court.
20. Id. at 112.
21. See, e.g., A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative,
Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/LRB8-G549] (last modified
May 2021).
22. Id.
23. See EDWARD F. COX ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-73.
24. See id. (estimating four years as the average duration of an investigation and
noting that some extend more than twenty years).
25. See id. at 73 (noting that alleged violators can continue their illegal conduct up
until the moment a final cease and desist order is granted).
26. See Letter from Lewis A. Engman, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Rep.
Harold T. Johnson (Nov. 9, 1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 36,610 (1973)
(explaining how the inability of the FTC to obtain preliminary injunctive relief allows
illegal conduct to continue unabated).
27. See id.

2022]

RETURNING TO THE STATUTORY TEXT

241

contempt order if a defendant violated its cease and desist order.28 For a
party engaged in illegal conduct, there was little incentive to not violate
the law because they could continue to act unlawfully even once sued
and, if ultimately found guilty, were simply prohibited from engaging in
that conduct without additional repercussions.29
Overall, the FTC’s ability to enforce its laws was constrained by a
cumbersome administrative adjudication process and weak remedies.30
So, in 1973, the agency turned to Congress for help.31
2. The Legislative History of Section 13(b)
In the early 1970s, the United States faced a dire energy crisis.32
U.S. oil production was in a steep decline and fraying international
relations spurred many members of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to curtail the amount of oil exported to the
United States.33 In response, Congress hurriedly worked to pass
legislation authorizing the construction of a crucial new domestic oil
pipeline in Alaska.34 This legislation, called the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, was introduced into Congress on March 1, 1973. 35
As the bill worked its way through Congress, Senator Henry Jackson of
Washington, at the behest of the FTC, offered up an amendment that
would increase the agency’s enforcement powers.36 This amendment
would ultimately add Section 13(b) to the FTC Act.37 Specifically, the
28. See EDWARD F. COX ET AL., supra note 12, at 73 (noting the general lack of
concern exhibited by respondents).
29. Id.
30. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 26-27.
32. See Richard Nixon, 37th President, United States of America, Address to the
Nation About Policies to Deal with the Energy Shortages (Nov. 7, 1973),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/255503 [https://perma.cc/36KQ-JHRT].
33. Id.
34. See MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON, H.R. DOC. NO. 187, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-4 (1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 36,620-22 (1973) (detailing Congress’
work to achieve energy self-sufficiency).
35. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591
(1973).
36. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1988). See 119
CONG. REC. 22,980 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson) (explaining how Section 53(b)
will enable the FTC to seek injunctive relief in federal district courts).
37. See § 408, 87 Stat. at 591 (adding Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15
U.S.C. § 53(b) (1988)).
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amendment would empower the FTC to sue, in district court, for a
temporary injunction whenever it had reason to believe that a defendant
was violating or was “about to violate” any of the FTC’s laws. 38
Additionally, the amendment contained a second provision that would
even allow the FTC to seek, in district court, a permanent injunction in
“proper cases . . . after proper proof.”39
The congressional intent of Section 13(b) is best explained by
examining the legislative history.40 A report by the Senate Commerce
Committee (“Commerce Committee Report”) focused on how, even
after the FTC initiates an internal adjudication, the perpetrator can
nonetheless continue to violate the law until a final order is issued.41
That oversight incentivizes defendants to delay the administrative
proceedings as long as possible, since they could freely violate the law
up until the administrative law judge issues a cease and desist order.42 In
light of this, the stated purpose of Section 13(b) was to remove this
constraint and make certain that there would be “prompt enforcement”
of the FTC’s laws.43
This sentiment was echoed during the congressional floor debates.44
Representative Neal Smith of Iowa recognized the acute need to halt
potentially illegal conduct “while the litigation winds its way through
final decision.”45 Representative John Melcher of Montana saw the
legislation as a key tool in removing “procedural roadblocks” and
allowing the FTC to act “in a quick and effective manner” to better
combat illegal conduct.46 Other representatives also noted that, since
Section 13(b) would be preliminarily used to enjoin defendants from
violating the law, there would no longer be an incentive for defendants
to prolong administrative proceedings.47 In sum, members of Congress

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 592.
Id.
See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
S. REP. NO. 93-151 (1973) (accompanying S. 356).
Id.
§ 408, 87 Stat. at 591 (1973).
See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
119 CONG. REC. 36,609 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Smith).
119 CONG. REC. 36,597 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Melcher).
119 CONG. REC. 36,609 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (“The possibility of
injunction should give serious second thoughts to those who plan a quick ‘killing’ and
withdrawal before retribution occurs.”). See also id. at 36,610 (remarks of Rep.
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supported Section 13(b) as a measure that would empower the courts to
both provide greater consumer protections and ease some of the
procedural constraints on the FTC’s enforcement authority.48
There was also much discussion surrounding the portion of Section
13(b) that would authorize the FTC to seek permanent injunctive
relief.49 While many in Congress thought permitting the FTC to seek
preliminary injunctions was a rational, measured response to a
legitimate procedural loophole, allowing the FTC to seek permanent
injunctions—thereby completely bypassing the internal administrative
process altogether—represented a remarkable increase in the FTC’s
enforcement abilities.50 Yet, despite the potential for significantlyincreased injunctive power, the legislative history suggests a more
measured purpose.51 First, as noted in the Commerce Committee Report,
the permanent injunction provision was intended to provide for the
quick disposition of cases involving run-of-the-mill fraud, such as
blatantly deceptive advertisements.52 The Commerce Committee Report
explained how, in such “proper cases” after The FTC proffered “proper
proof,” the district court would be able to dispose of the case by issuing
a permanent injunction—a remedy that is essentially the same as the
cease and desist order that caps the arduous administrative process but
in a much shorter time frame.53 Second, there were concerns from the
judiciary that limiting its role to issuing a preliminary injunction with no
control over the FTC’s subsequent internal administrative adjudication
would reduce its oversight on the case.54 Allowing judges to hear the
entire case and issue a permanent injunction would placate these
concerns by giving district courts total control over the disposition of the
matter.55

Johnson) (explaining how enjoined parties would no longer find it advantageous to
delay FTC proceedings).
48. § 408, 87 Stat. at 591 (“[T]he investigative and law enforcement
responsibilities of the [FTC] have been restricted and hampered because of inadequate
legal authority . . . to seek preliminary injunctive relief . . . .”).
49. See infra notes 50-54.
50. Compare Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), with Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
51. S. REP. NO. 93-151 (1973) (accompanying S. 356) (explaining the history of
bill).
52. Id. at 30-31.
53. Id. at 44, 52.
54. Id. at 30-31.
55. Id.
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In sum, Section 13(b) revolutionized the FTC’s ability to enforce
its laws.56 At a minimum, the FTC could now ask a court to temporarily
enjoin illegal conduct while the agency’s administrative proceedings
played out.57 Even better, for garden-variety violations, the FTC could
also request a court to permanently enjoin the illegal conduct, a remedy
that was just as good, if not better, than what the FTC previously could
only get at the end of an arduous administrative adjudication.58
B. SECTION 13(B) IN ACTION: THE RISE OF THE “LIKELIHOOD OF
RECURRENCE” STANDARD
This Section will examine the caselaw that developed as the FTC
began using its powers under Section 13(b) to litigate directly in federal
district court. Section II.B.1 explains the FTC’s initial difficulty in
bringing Section 13(b) cases. Section II.B.2 examines how the
“likelihood of recurrence” test became the paramount standard used by
courts when determining if the FTC has shown that a defendant is
“about to violate” the law.
1. A Slow Start and a Constitutional Challenge
After Section 13(b) was passed, the FTC did not exactly rush to
district court to seek injunctions through its newly-delegated authority.59
In fact, five years after Section 13(b) was passed, the General
Accounting Office criticized the FTC for not making better use of its
new Section 13(b) powers.60 Then, in the 1980s, the FTC began to use
its Section 13(b) authority more frequently, especially in consumer fraud
cases.61 These initial actions invited a broad constitutional challenge to

56.
57.
58.

See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
Id. See S. REP. NO. 93-151 (1973) (accompanying S. 356) (explaining history

of bill).
59. Letter from Gregory J. Ahart, Director, U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, to Michael
Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, in 889 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-24, F-1 (Nov. 16, 1978).
60. Id. See also COMPTROLLER GENERAL, VICTIMS OF UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES
GET LIMITED HELP FROM THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 78-140, at
23-24 (1978).
61. See, e.g., FTC v. Pharmatech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 294 (D.D.C. 1983).
See also Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special
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Section 13(b).62 FTC v. American National Cellular challenged the
constitutionality of Section 13(b), claiming that giving the FTC the
ability to seek injunctive relief essentially granted the agency law
enforcement authority in violation of the separation of powers.63 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.64
2. The “Likelihood of Recurrence” Test Emerges
After fending off a challenge to the constitutionality of Section
13(b), the FTC began to use its Section 13(b) authority much more
frequently, especially for consumer protection cases.65 In fact, by the
late 1990s, the FTC was litigating the majority of its consumer fraud
cases in district courts instead of through administrative adjudication.66
As the FTC increasingly asserted its Section 13(b) authority,
conflict arose over the “is violating, or is about to violate” language in
the statute.67 In particular, there was confusion regarding how to
determine whether a defendant is “about to violate” the law.68 The
statute neither defined the word “about” nor explained how to
distinguish a party that merely has the potential to violate the law from a
party that is on the verge of violating the law.69 As a result, courts faced
a dilemma over how to define common words70 and phrases when they
appear in a statute.71 This phenomenon is not unusual; words and
phrases that are easily understood in everyday parlance can quickly

Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43,
78-85 (1989) (Kirkpatrick II) [hereinafter The Kirkpatrick Report].
62. FTC v. Am. Nat’l Cellular, 810 F.2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir. 1987).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1514.
65. See The Kirkpatrick Report, supra note 61, at 78-85.
66. See Stephen Calkins, Articles and Comments: An Enforcement Official’s
Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 432 (1997) (“[M]ost FTC
consumer protection enforcement is now conducted directly in court under [Section
13(b)], rather than by means of administrative adjudication.”).
67. See, e.g., FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985).
68. Id.
69. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
70. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, 566 U.S. 560 (2012) (analyzing how to define
the word “interpreter”).
71. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) (analyzing how to define
the phrase “law enforcement officer”).
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devolve into complicated legal quagmires as each party pushes
interpretations beneficial to their cause.72
At first, courts simply dodged parties’ attempts to convince them to
establish a standard for determining whether a defendant is “about to
violate” the law.73 One court even came to the tortured conclusion that a
defendant’s past violations (which all parties agreed had stopped) were
actually still ongoing, all so the court would not have to answer the
potentially precedent-setting question of how to evaluate whether a
defendant is “about to violate” the law.74
Eventually, however, courts began to coalesce around a standard
for determining whether a defendant is “about to violate” the law.75
Decades before Congress added Section 13(b) to the FTC Act, the
Supreme Court ruled in United States v. W.T. Grant Co. that injunctive
relief can be granted against any defendant who previously violated the
law so long as there is a “cognizable danger of recurrent violation.”76
Eventually, the Ninth Circuit became the first court to apply that
standard to a Section 13(b) case, ruling that its decision to grant
injunctive relief hinged on whether the defendant’s violations were
“likely to recur.”77 The Ninth Circuit did not seem to think that the
“likelihood of recurrence” standard was in tension with the plain text of
Section 13(b), which requires that violations be about to occur, not
merely likely to occur.78
Despite this potential friction, numerous courts across the country,
when faced with a defendant who had already violated the law and may
72. See also Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); Kevin Aguirre,
Willfulness in a Post-Robare World: Evidence of Subjective Intent, Not Negligence
Conduct, is Needed to Show Willful Violations of Securities Laws, 25 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 501 (2020) (discussing judicial interpretation of the term “willful,” as
found in various provisions of the securities laws). See generally Taniguchi, 566 U.S.
560; Ali, 552 U.S. 214.
73. See, e.g., FTC v. Va. Homes Mfg. Corp., 509 F. Supp. 51, 56-57 (D. Md.
1981), aff’d, 661 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1981). This was the first case where the FTC sought
a permanent injunction under its Section 13(b) authority.
74. Id. at 56-58 (ruling that, although the defendant had stopped distributing the
unlawful warranty services, the fact that those warranties remained in public circulation
was sufficient to infer that violations were ongoing).
75. See, e.g., FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985).
76. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). This is known as
the “likelihood of recurrence” test.
77. FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1985).
78. See id.
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be “about to violate” the law again, have since adopted the “likelihood
of recurrence” test to determine whether to grant an injunction.79 Under
this test, violations are likely to recur if there is a “cognizable danger of
future violations.”80 These “cognizable danger” factors can include:
The degree of scienter, whether the conduct was an isolated instance
or recurrent, whether the defendants’ current occupations position
them to commit future violations, the degree of harm consumers
suffered from defendants’ unlawful conduct, and defendants’
recognition of their own culpability and the sincerity of their
assurances (if any) against future violations.81

Notably, some of those factors consider past conduct while others
consider potential indicators of future violations.82
Ostensibly, both types of factors must be present, since Section
13(b) does not allow injunctive relief based on past violations alone.83
Nonetheless, courts have allowed the FTC to seek injunctive relief

79. E.g., FTC v. USA Fin., 415 F. App’x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2011); FTC v.
Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Elegant Sols., No. SACV
19-1333 JVS (KESx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137774 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2020)
(granting a request for a permanent injunction because “the FTC has reason to believe
that the past conduct is likely to recur”); FTC v. BF Labs, No. 14-CV-00815-BCW,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174223 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying a request for a
preliminary injunction because the court was “unable to find that there was a cognizable
danger of recurrent violations”); FTC v. Home Assure, No. 09-cv-547-T-23TBM, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32053 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2009) (denying a request for a preliminary
injunction because the court was “unable to find that there is a cognizable danger of
recurrent violation or some reasonable likelihood of future violations”); FTC v. Nat’l
Urological Grp., No. 04-CV-3294-CAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57382 (N.D. Ga. June
24, 2005) (denying a request for an injunction after finding that the past violations were
not likely to recur); FTC v. Crescent Publ’g Grp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(granting a request for a preliminary injunction because “there is a material likelihood
of future violations”); FTC v. Equinox Int’l Corp., CV-S-99-0969-JBR (RLH), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19866 (D. Nev. Sept. 14, 1999).
80. FTC v. Citigroup, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (quoting FTC
v. Magui Publishers, No. 89–3818, 1991 WL 90895, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 1991)).
81. Magui, 1991 WL 90895, at *15.
82. See id. Compare forward-looking factors such as “whether the defendant’s
current occupations position them to commit future violations” with backward-looking
factors such as “the degree of harm consumers suffered from defendants’ unlawful
conduct.” Id.
83. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (establishing that the FTC
can seek injunctive relief only when a defendant “is violating, or is about to violate” the
law).
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solely based on past violations.84 One court ruled that “the protracted
and systematic nature of [the defendant’s] past conduct and the degree
of harm consumers suffered from it would certainly permit an inference
of future misconduct and likelihood of recurrent bad acts.”85 Far from
even pretending to consider whether the defendant was “about to
violate” the law, the court ruled in favor of the FTC based solely on the
defendant’s “past conduct” and “degree of harm consumers suffered.”86
At least one other district court has taken a similar approach.87
In another case, a court stretched its application of the “likelihood
of recurrence” test to find that “an extensive history of violations does
beget an inference that future violations are likely to occur.”88 Under this
reasoning, for the FTC to satisfactorily show that a defendant is “about
to violate” the law, all the agency needs to do is show an “[e]xtensive
history of violations.”89 All told, these cases demonstrate how, despite
the text of Section 13(b), merely alleging past violations can be
sufficient for a court to infer that additional violations are about to
occur.90
The “likelihood of recurrence” standard is so entrenched that even
courts noting its potential incompatibility with the plain text of Section
13(b) use it anyway.91 For instance, one court, upon analyzing whether a
defendant was “about to violate” the law, noted that Section 13(b)
required it to “independently assess whether violations are imminent.”92
Yet, despite recognizing this imminency requirement, the court went
ahead and analyzed the claims under the “likelihood of recurrence”
84. See, e.g., FTC v. ENGAGE-A-CAR Servs., No. 86-3758, 1986 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16357, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 1986).
85. Id. at *12.
86. Id.
87. See FTC v. Shopper Sys., No. 12-23919, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204102, at *9
(S.D. Fla. July 3, 2013) (issuing a preliminary injunction after finding that the “alleged
violations . . . are likely to recur in the future given the past alleged violations of the
FTC Act” (emphasis added)).
88. FTC v. GTP Mktg., No. 4-90-123, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3325, at *12–13
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1990).
89. Id.
90. Id.; Shopper Sys., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204102, at *9; FTC v. ENGAGE-ACAR Servs., No. 86-3758, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16357, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 17,
1986).
91. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
92. FTC v. Merch. Servs. Direct, No. 13-CV-0279, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
114960, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2013) (emphasis added).
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test.93 The court did not explain why it recognized the necessity of one
standard (that violations must be “imminent”) but disregarded it entirely
and employed another (that violations need only be “likely to recur”).94
In sum, the “likelihood of recurrence” test is now the wellestablished principle used by courts when determining if a defendant
accused of past violations is “about to violate” again.95 Although the
“about to violate” language in Section 13(b) suggests that injunctive
relief should only be awarded if violations are “about” to occur, rather
than merely “likely” to occur, courts continue to use the “likelihood of
recurrence” standard.96 Additionally, some courts have awarded
93.
94.
95.

Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *4, *9–10.
See FTC v. USA Fin., 415 F. App’x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2011); FTC v.
Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Elegant Sols., No. SACV
19-1333 JVS (KESx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137774 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2020)
(granting a request for a permanent injunction because “the FTC has reason to believe
that the past conduct is likely to recur”); FTC v. BF Labs, No. 14-CV-00815-BCW,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174223 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying a request for a
preliminary injunction because the court was “unable to find that there was a cognizable
danger of recurrent violations”); FTC v. Home Assure, No. 09-cv-547-T-23TBM, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32053 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2009) (denying a request for a preliminary
injunction because the court was “unable to find that there is a cognizable danger of
recurrent violation or some reasonable likelihood of future violations”); FTC v. Nat’l
Urological Grp., No. 04-CV-3294-CAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57382 (N.D. Ga. June
24, 2005) (denying a request for an injunction after finding that the past violations were
not likely to recur); FTC v. Crescent Publ’g Grp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(granting a request for a preliminary injunction because “there is a material likelihood
of future violations”); FTC v. Equinox Int’l Corp., CV-S-99-0969-JBR (RLH), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19866 (D. Nev. Sept. 14, 1999).
96. See FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1985); FTC v.
USA Fin., 415 F. App’x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2011); FTC v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187,
1201-02 (10th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Elegant Sols., No. SACV 19-1333 JVS (KESx), 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137774 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2020) (granting a request for a permanent
injunction because “the FTC has reason to believe that the past conduct is likely to
recur”); FTC v. BF Labs, No. 14-CV-00815-BCW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174223
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (denying a request for a preliminary injunction because the
court was “unable to find that there was a cognizable danger of recurrent violations”);
FTC v. Home Assure, No. 09-cv-547-T-23TBM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32053 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 8, 2009) (denying a request for a preliminary injunction because the court was
“unable to find that there is a cognizable danger of recurrent violation or some
reasonable likelihood of future violations”); FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., No. 04-CV3294-CAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57382 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2005) (denying a request
for an injunction after finding that the past violations were not likely to recur); FTC v.
Crescent Publ’g Grp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting a request for a
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injunctive relief based solely on past violations – a result that may stray
even further afield from the text of Section 13(b).97
III. THE CRUSADE AGAINST THE “LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE”
STANDARD
For over three decades, the “likelihood of recurrence” test enjoyed
widespread acceptance by courts hearing Section 13(b) cases.98
Recently, however, there has been some significant pushback, especially
in the Third Circuit.99 This Part examines recent caselaw that imperils
the supremacy of the “likelihood of recurrence” standard.
A. SHIRE VIROPHARMA AND A NEW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Recently, the ordinary power of courts to issue permanent
injunctions has been threatened by a narrow judicial construction of the
“about to violate” language of Section 13(b).100 Shire ViroPharma, Inc.
(“Shire”)—a pharmaceutical company—produced a lucrative drug for
the treatment of a life-threatening intestinal infection.101 When a
competitor wanted to create a cheaper generic equivalent, Shire barraged
the FDA with dubious filings designed to delay the equivalent’s
approval.102 Five years after Shire lost that battle with the FDA, the FTC
sued, alleging that Shire had engaged in the anticompetitive practice of
“sham petitioning.”103 It invoked Section 13(b) to seek a permanent
injunction, claiming that although the sham petitioning process for that
preliminary injunction because “there is a material likelihood of future violations”);
FTC v. Equinox Int’l Corp., CV-S-99-0969-JBR (RLH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19866
(D. Nev. Sept. 14, 1999).
97. See FTC v. Shopper Sys., No. 12-23919, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204102, at *9
(S.D. Fla. July 3, 2013); FTC v. GTP Mktg., No. 4-90-123, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3325, at *12–13 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1990); FTC v. ENGAGE-A-CAR Servs., No. 863758, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16357, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 1986).
98. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
99. See FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147, 156–159 (3d Cir. 2019).
100. Id.
101. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 1, FTC v. Shire
ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2019).
102. Id. at 16-21.
103. Id. “Sham petitioning” is the practice of petitioning in bad faith before an
executive agency to ensure that the approval of a competitor’s product is delayed or
denied.
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drug had ceased, there was a danger that Shire could engage in similar
sham petitioning with another drug in the future.104 The FTC argued
they had satisfied the “about to violate” statutory language of Section
13(b) by showing a past violation and a reasonable likelihood of
recurrent future conduct.105
Shire prevailed in the district court.106 On appeal to the Third
Circuit, the court affirmed.107 In the opinion, Chief Judge Smith cited
Section 13(b) as constraining the courts’ customary power to issue
permanent injunctions, specifically noting that the “about to violate”
language of the statute plainly establishes a burden that is higher than
the “likelihood of recurrence” standard that the FTC put forth.108 The
panel’s tone—criticizing the FTC for “trot[ting] out” the argument that
remedial legislation should be liberally construed—suggests a hostility
to the FTC’s mission and little concern over Shire’s allegedly unlawful
campaign to protect its monopoly that burdened insurers and patients
with high costs for a vital medicine.109 As for establishing the “exact
confines” of the “about to violate” language, the Third Circuit left that
task “for another day.”110
B. THE VARIED RESPONSES TO SHIRE
The judicial response to Shire has not been uniform.111 One court
found Shire unpersuasive and ruled that the “about to violate” pleading
standard can be met, even if the illegal conduct has stopped, so long as
the FTC presents evidence that violations “could” resume.112 Compared
to Shire, this opinion presents an even looser interpretation of Section

104.
105.

Id. at 44-45.
Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission’s Opposition to Shire ViroPharma Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss at 8-10, FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, No. 17-cv-00131, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45727 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018).
106. FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, No. 17-cv-00131, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45727, at
*19 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018).
107. FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147, 161 (3d Cir. 2019).
108. Id. at 156, 159.
109. Id. at 158.
110. Id. at 160.
111. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
112. FTC ex rel. Yost v. Educare Ctr. Servs., 433 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1012–14 (W.D.
Tex. 2020). The court was particularly concerned that the defendant still maintained the
“intact infrastructure” used in the previous violations. Id.
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13(b), one where “could violate” is now synonymous with “about to
violate.”113
Additionally, two district courts in the Ninth Circuit declined to
follow Shire.114 This is hardly surprising considering that the Ninth
Circuit was the first to adopt the “likelihood of recurrence” test, which
remains the binding precedent in that circuit.115 Neither district court
ruling was appealed.116
Shire did convince a district court in the Eleventh Circuit to take a
fresh look at the “ordinary meaning” of Section 13(b)’s text; it
concluded that the “likelihood of recurrence” standard did not accurately
reflect the language of the statute.117 The court found that “about to
violate” “evokes imminence, as if the offending action could be resumed
with little delay.”118 By contrast, “[l]ikelihood of recurrence is less
immediate than ‘about to.’ It is similar to a preponderance, ‘more likely
than not.’”119 Despite abrogating the “likelihood of recurrence” standard,
the court did not assert any new framework for determining whether a
defendant is “about to violate” the law.120 It hinted that the FTC must
show that there is some “imminence” as to the violations but did not
establish any factors that courts could use to analyze whether a
defendant is “about to violate” the law.121 Regardless, this ruling,
coupled with Shire, suggests a potential for widespread change in how
courts interpret the “about to violate” requirement of Section 13(b)
cases.122

113. Compare FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 2019), with
Educare Ctr. Servs., 433 F. Supp. 3d at 1013-14.
114. See FTC v. Elec. Payment Sols. of Am., No. 17-02535, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157978, at *25-26 (D. Ariz. Aug. 28, 2019); FTC v. Adept Mgmt., No. 16-cv-720, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96061, at *1 (D. Or. June 7, 2019).
115. FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985).
116. See FTC v. Elec. Payment Sols. of Am., No. 17-02535, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157978, at *25-26 (D. Ariz. Aug. 28, 2019); FTC v. Adept Mgmt., No. 16-cv-720, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96061, at *1 (D. Or. June 7, 2019).
117. FTC v. Hornbeam Special Situations, No. 17-cv-3094, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
204340, at *12-13 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2018). This ruling came before Shire was
affirmed by the Third Circuit.
118. Id. at *13.
119. Id. at *13-14.
120. Id. at *16.
121. Id. at *13-14.
122. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Section III introduced the current debate over whether the
“likelihood of recurrence” standard is the appropriate test to determine,
under Section 13(b), whether a defendant is about to violate the law.
This Section will argue that the “likelihood of recurrence” test should
not be used because it is unfaithful to the plain meaning and
congressional intent of Section 13(b).
A. THE “LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE” TEST IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
PLAIN MEANING OF SECTION 13(B)’S TEXT
The plain meaning of the “about to violate” language of Section
13(b) demands a standard that is higher than the “likelihood of
recurrence” standard.123 Generally, when interpreting a statute, the first
step is to consider the plain meaning of the statutory text.124 If the text of
the statute has a plain, unambiguous meaning, that interpretation will
control absent extenuating factors.125
When courts evaluate the plain meaning of statutory text, some
factors that are often considered include the common usage or dictionary
definition of the word or phrase.126 In fact, courts often turn to dictionary
definitions when a word or phrase is undefined in a statute, as is the case
here.127 According to Merriam-Webster, a leading American English-

123.
124.

See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
See generally Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); Taniguchi v.
Kan Pac. Saipan, 566 U.S. 560 (2012); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214
(2008).
125. The bar for a court to disregard the plain, unambiguous meaning of a statute is
incredibly high. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (ruling
that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) must comply with the plain meaning of
particular language in the Endangered Species Act, even though doing so would force
the TVA to abandon a $100 million dam construction project that was already well
underway); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1985) (upholding a statutorilyset filing deadline of “prior to December 31st” because it was clear and unambiguous,
even though the agency all but admitted that it was a scrivener’s error and did not
intend to foreclose filings made on December 31st).
126. See generally Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731; Taniguchi, 566 U.S. 560; Ali, 552 U.S.
214.
127. E.g., Taniguchi, 556 U.S. at 566-70 (using dictionary definitions to
differentiate between an “interpreter” and a “translator”); Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (using the dictionary definition of “marketing” to
interpret a statute).
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language dictionary, the adverb “about” is defined as “almost” or “on
the verge of.”128 This definition is clear, well-established, commonly
recognized, and non-technical. As such, the ordinary meaning of “about
to” is clear and unambiguous.129
Returning to Merriam-Webster, the word “likely” is best defined as
“probably.”130 This clearly does not evoke the same level of imminence
or immediacy that is required under the plain meaning of Section
13(b)’s statutory text.131 Put simply, the phrases “likely to” and “about
to” are not interchangeable.132
As such, the “likelihood of recurrence” test inadvertently sets a
standard that is lower than what is required by the plain meaning of the
“about to violate” language of Section 13(b). Since the “likelihood of
recurrence” test does not comport with the plain meaning of the text,
courts should no longer use it when determining if a defendant is “about
to violate” the law. Instead, courts should undertake an analysis that
stays true to the plain meaning of the statutory text. Under such an
analysis, the phrase “about to violate” should be interpreted as it is
commonly understood. The examination should primarily consider
whether the defendant is on the verge of violating the law, and other
factors that help inform whether the violations are imminent, rather than
merely likely.
B. THE “LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE” TEST IS UNFAITHFUL TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF SECTION 13(B)
Additionally, the congressional intent discerned from the statute’s
legislative history suggests that the “likelihood of recurrence” test is not
the appropriate standard for Section 13(b) cases.133 Generally, if the
128. About, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/about [https://perma.cc/8S5C-L4B8] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
129. See Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 187-89 (finding that the ordinary meaning of
a word in a statute is clear if there is a standard and well-accepted definition of that
word).
130. Likely, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/likley [https://perma.cc/C929-S4YF] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
131. See Taniguchi, 556 U.S. at 566-70 (ruling that a translator cannot be considered
an “interpreter” because it requires a different skillset and entails different job
functions).
132. See id.
133. See infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
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plain meaning of the text is clear, that interpretation will control, and the
statutory analysis will end there.134 Courts will look past the plain
meaning of the statutory text only if there is a severe and irreconcilable
conflict between the plain meaning of the text and the express intent of
the legislature.135
Here, the purpose and legislative history of Section 13(b) are not
irreconcilable with its plain meaning and, in fact, both actually support
an interpretation of the text grounded in its plain meaning.136 The
legislative history makes clear that Section 13(b) was designed to serve
two goals: to halt ongoing illegal conduct while the FTC is prosecuting
it and to halt pending conduct (typically mergers) that the FTC believes
would be illegal if it came to fruition.137 Essentially, it was intended to
be a “gap filler” that removed minor procedural hurdles and
supplemented the agency’s existing legal authority.138
Instead, far from being a mere gap filler, Section 13(b) now serves
as the conduit through which the FTC litigates almost all of its
enforcement actions.139 Of course, there is nothing wrong with the FTC
deciding to make the most of this valuable enforcement tool–one that
has become all the more salient as the FTC combats novel issues, such
as data privacy and information security.140 Instead, the pivotal issue is
that the widespread use of the “likelihood of recurrence” test has

134. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (ruling that the plain
meaning of the term “sex” must control, even though doing so expands the scope of the
statute well beyond what Congress had likely anticipated when they originally passed
the statute).
135. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 497-98 (2015) (refusing to adopt the plain
meaning of a word in the statute because doing so would doom the very program
created by the statute).
136. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
137. See discussion supra Section II.A.
138. See id.
139. See Calkins, supra note 66.
140. See Letter from Chairman Joseph J. Simons, Fed. Trade Comm’n Chairman,
Noah Joshua Phillips, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, Rohit Chopra, Fed. Trade Comm’n
Comm’r, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, and Christine S.
Wilson, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.adlawaccess.com/
wp-content/uploads/sites/793/2020/10/2020.10.22-FTC-Letter-Section-13b-of-theFTC-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/57KE-L6RL] (noting that recent adverse caselaw
threatens the FTC’s ability to use its Section 13(b) authority to combat issues of data
security and privacy).
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enabled the agency to bring cases under Section 13(b) that were never
intended to be under the statute’s purview: cases where the illegal
conduct is neither ongoing nor imminent.141 Since the 1980s, the FTC
has used the “likelihood of recurrence” test to convince courts that an
allegation of past illegal conduct alone is sufficient to trigger its Section
13(b) authority to issue injunctive relief.142 This should not be allowed
to continue.
Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
for Section 13(b) to give the FTC authority to seek injunctive relief for
violations that occurred solely in the past.143 The FTC already has an
avenue for litigating such cases: internal administrative adjudication.144
In those cases, where the violations occurred in the past and are no
longer ongoing, none of the important procedural and practical concerns
that spurred the adoption of Section 13(b) are present.145
In sum, the widespread acceptance of the “likelihood of recurrence”
test has caused injunctive relief to be awarded in cases that were never
intended to be covered by Section 13(b).146 As discussed in Section
IV.A., the plain meaning of the phrase “about to violate” demands that
the “likelihood of recurrence” test be discontinued, an argument that is
further supported by an examination of the congressional intent of
Section 13(b). For those reasons, courts should no longer use the
“likelihood of recurrence” test when determining if a defendant is
“about to violate” the law.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
See id.
See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
Section 13(b) was intended to solve the problem that the FTC had no way to
halt impending or ongoing illegal conduct while they prosecuted it. When the FTC
prosecutes conduct that is no longer ongoing, that problem is not present. See supra
notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
146. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (mandating violations
must be either “ongoing” or “about” to occur); FTC v. ENGAGE-A-CAR Servs., No.
86-3758, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16357, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 1986); FTC v.
Shopper Sys., No. 12-23919, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204102, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 3,
2013) (issuing a preliminary injunction after finding that the “alleged violations . . . are
likely to recur in the future given the past alleged violations of the FTC Act” (emphasis
added)); FTC v. GTP Mktg., No. 4-90-123, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3325, at *12–13
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1990).
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V. CONCLUSION
In 1973, the FTC gained the authority to seek injunctive relief in
federal district court so long as it had reason to believe that a defendant
“is violating, or is about to violate” any of the laws enforced by the
agency.147 Since then, courts have predominantly used the “likelihood of
recurrence” test – which asks whether past violations are “likely to
recur” – to determine whether a defendant is “about to violate” the
law.148 Recently, however, the dominance of the “likelihood of
recurrence” test has come under scrutiny as courts question whether the
principle is more permissive in granting injunctive relief than the text of
Section 13(b) requires.149
An examination of the plain meaning and congressional intent,
which can be discerned through the legislative history, of Section 13(b)
shows that the statute does indeed set a bar for awarding injunctive relief
that is higher than the “likelihood of recurrence” standard.150 Namely,
Section 13(b) requires that future violations be imminent or impending –
not merely likely – for injunctive relief to be granted.151 Since the
“likelihood of recurrence” test does not comport with the plain meaning
or congressional intent of the statute, courts should no longer use it
when determining if a defendant is “about to violate” the law.152 Instead,
courts must undertake an analysis that is true to the text, an analysis that
must carefully and properly consider whether future violations are truly
about to occur.153
It is an immense power to be able to sue a party for violations that
are yet to occur. This resolution would appropriately restrain that power
by preventing the FTC from bringing cases against parties where their
violative conduct is only likely to recur.154 Importantly, this resolution
does not take away the FTC’s power to proactively sue for future
violations.155 For instance, the FTC can still sue a party if their violative
conduct becomes so imminent that they are truly about to violate the

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
See discussion supra Section II.B.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
See discussion supra Part IV.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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law.156 And, of course, the FTC can still sue a party once it is actively
violating the law.157 In this way, interpreting the statute under its plain
meaning and intent strikes a careful balance that prevents agency
overreach while ensuring that Section 13(b) remains a powerful tool for
protecting consumers.158
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158.

Id.
Id.
Id.

